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The Soviet Union has made some substantive and symbolic steps to institute
glasnost' (openness) in the military. This study has concentrated on current limitations or
even reversals of military g, asnost'.
Military glasnost' in the USSR is not a strategic deception. However, the deeply
entrenched practices, the pe uliarities of Soviet political culture, and the uncertainties of the
military-political situation ire likely to complicate verification of at least some of arms
control and confidence-buil ling measures agreements as well as confuse the U.S. about its
understanding of Soviet mil tary plans and intentions.
The introduction of glasnost' in the Soviet society in general and the military in
particular has been necessit ited by the terminal crisis of communist ideology, politics, and
economics. Exceptional secrecy, a crucial weapon in the marathon confrontation between
"socialism" and "capitalism," has become an impediment to economic and political progress
while the importance of confrontation and "class warfare" is clearly declining. An inter-
agency research program recommended significant relaxation of secrecy regulations.
However, there is no law on state secrets. Without that, the recommendations cannot be
implemented in a consistent way.
The Soviet military has grave reservations about glasnost'. Not only have Soviet
military bases been opened to foreign inspectors, but also the Soviet military has been
opened to public scrutiny and impassioned criticism. The secretiveness of the Soviet
military is prompted both by habit and self-interest. Although the new Law on the Press
has abolished the preliminary censorship of mass media, the military censorship continues
to function as a department of the General Staff, and has the powers to punish the mass




The Soviets have made a substantial progress by acknowledging past cases of
deception. In arms control, they have acknowledged that the large phased-array radar near
Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In military doctrine, they now
recognize that the widely trumpeted "Tula-line" of Leonid Brezhnev (according to which
the Soviet Union did not believe in the possibility of winning a nuclear war and was not
striving to seek military superiority) did not affect the real Soviet plans for fighting and
winning a nuclear war and for seeking military superiority over NATO, Japan and China
taken together.
It is of utmost significance that none of these confessions came from
the Soviet military, but rather from civilian officials. The Soviet military
command has not only failed even to support such statements, but either
has avoided the issue altogether or has attempted to argue against the
admission of Soviet deception, as in the case of the ABM radar.
On the one hand, Minister of Defense Yazov speaks about establishing
"transparent" in military affairs; on the other, the military continues to warn against
Western "espionage." They suggest that they are opposed to anything but the most
narrowly defined glasnost', sufficient only for minimum arms control verification
requiremen s. The Soviets have recently given access to some of their military and R&D
facilities, including those associated with BMD lasers, to visiting American officials and
scientists. The visitors appear to have been exposed primarily to the hardware whose
general characteristics had oeen publicly disclosed by the U.S. intelligence community.
Even this lii nited access has caused open irritation among many in the military.
The Soviet military has been profoundly influenced by the Soviet/Russian
bureaucratic elite's political culture, which has developed for centuries without any concept
of accountability to the public and respect for law. It has been characterized by the building
of elaborate Potemkin villages to deceive one's own political leaders and foreign visitors.
Already under glasnost', tl e Soviet military has attempted to mislead public opinion at
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home and abroad on several issues. Thus, it appears that their "real" defense
budget, disclosed with great fanfare in 1989, does not include such
spending categories as nationwide military training of pre-draft youths and
compulsory reserve officer training conducted in hundreds of colleges. It
is also likely that it excludes such weighty spending categories as
construction, operation and maintenance of very extensive nuclear war
command, control and survival facilities for the Soviet leadership, as well
as some of civil defense facilities and activities.
The Soviet military establishment suffers from an ingrained tendency to mislead the
public when the stakes are high (as in the case of ABM LPAR or the defense budget), as
well as when the stakes are low. For example, the Soviet Ministry of Defense has
excluded civilian employees of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
from their count of the Warsaw Pact strength because these civilians
allegedly do not receive military training. It has turned out, however, that
all the civilian employees of GSFG, including women (who are normally
not even subject to military draft) have to take part in military training.
The U.S. can not be certain about Soviet compliance with arms control agreements
and military intentions until the Soviet public itself gains the right to know about such
matters. The attempt to give the Soviet public such a right through the work of the new
Committee of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet has not been
successful. The Committee's membership is completely dominated by defense industry
executives, high-ranking military and KGB officers, and communist party officials. As a
result, it has done nothing to provide the public with any meaningful information about the
current and planned Soviet military activities, and has been widely perceived as nothing
more than an adjunct to the defense establishment.
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In the final analysis, the future of military glasnost' depends on the course of
political developments in the Soviet Union. If Gorbachev's program of muddling
modernization continues, military glasnost' will survive as well. It will be hampered,
however, if Gorbachev needs to rely more and more on the military for keeping the Soviet
Union together and preventing workers' unrest. If an alliance of conservative communist
party officials, Russian nationalists of a more conservative ilk, and military and KGB
leaders takes over, military glasnost' has a very bleak future. Radical democratization of
the Soviet Union would be beneficial for military glasnost', but it is far from certain that a
truly democratic government would be able to enforce all aspects of its military policy.
Any of these courses of political development may lead to the disintegration of the
Soviet Union. A democratic government in Moscow can dissolve the Soviet empire into a
confederation of states on reasonably amicable terms with each other, which would be
conducive to compliance with existing, by that time, arms control agreements. The current
government and particularly a conservative regime would be less likely to manage an
amicable divorce between the Union republics. Their hostile relations would be an obstacle
to their observance of arms control agreements and the rules of military glasnost'. That
could result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the control of a government in
Moscow, and unconstrained by existing arms control agreements.
It is possible that instead of a more or less controlled dissolution of the Soviet
empire, we will be faced w-th a collapse of central authority. This would mean massive
involvement of the military in politics and security operations, both conditions not
conducive to military glasnost'. In this case, military glasvost' itself would lose some of
its relevance because the meaning of at least some arms control agreements concluded now
or in the near future would be lost in a changed world. At the same time, the West would
have a tremendous stake in assuring the security and stability of Soviet command and
Tsypkin
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control of nuclear weapon; . We could only hope that a measure of military glasnost'
sufficient for this purpose would survive even under extreme circumstances.
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1. 0. INTRODUCTION.
The Soviet militaiy spent decades establishing its reputation for extreme
secretiveness. Under Mikhail Gorbachev this reputation has been challenged by
verification of arms control ind confidence building agreements through on-site inspections
of Soviet Armed Forces (S \F) and defense industry installations, by publication of the
Soviet military budget, a id by a sharp discussion by the mass media and by the
reconstituted Supreme Sov et of various ills plaguing the military establishment. These
innovations are grouped tc gether under the term of glasnost' ("openness"), a policy
introduced by Gorbachev in 1986-1987 in order to reinvigorate the Soviet society, to curtail
the excesses of bureaucracy, to narrow the gap between the rulers and the ruled, and also to
help present a less secretive ind therefore less threatening image to the outside world.
The United States is negotiating a series of complex arms control agreements with
the Soviets. We may expect future negotiations for even more complex and sweeping arms
control measures. The recent Soviet record of compliance and openness gives grounds for
serious concerns. For example, the Soviets had denied for a number of years that their
large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk was a direct and major violation of the ABM
Treaty. Recently the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze acknowledged that it
was. 1 Since the security of he United States and of our allies, political stability in Europe
and Asia, as well as other at eas of the world, will depend on Soviet compliance with such
agreements, on their open cooperation with the rest of the world, we must ask: how likely
are the Soviets to cheat, to employ secrecy to gain unilateral advantages in an era of military
glasnost'l
1E. A. Shevardnadze, "Vneshny a politika i perestroika," fzvestiya, O ober 24. 1989.
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Simply compiling a litany of Soviet past transgressions is clearly no longer a useful
approach to predicting their future behavior. The escalation of recent events—completely
unpredictable within the traditional analytical framework of a Sovietology based upon
established policy patterns and current policy pronouncements by top officials—is
demanding a broader approach. We must look at the whole political context in which
military glasnost' measures are implemented. This is necessary not only because today's
volatile political climate directly affects all spheres of life, but also because this is the way
the Soviets themselves approach policy analysis. In contrast to the Americans, who tend to
proceed from a single fact of life to evaluating its broader context, the Soviet/Russian
political culture emphasizes a progression from an analysis of a general political situation to
that of its particular concrete aspects.
In a similar fashion, this study will move from an assessment of the general
political situation to the role of secrecy in Soviet society as a whole, to the current struggle
of glasnost' and secrecy in the Soviet military, and finally to a forecast of possible political
scenarios as they might affect Soviet military practices in the area of secrecy and deception.
2. 0. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF MILITARY GLASNOST'.
2. 1. The Crisis Of Soviet Confidence.
All the three main policies associated with Mikhail Gorbachev—perestroika, or
restructuring of Soviet political and economic institutions, glasnost', or public airing of
various social, political and economic problems, and "new thinking" in national security-
have been initiated because of a profound crisis all spheres of Soviet life. Beginning in the
1970's, dissident intellectu Is have been warning about inevitable entropy unless urgent
Tsypkin
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reforms are introduced. Mikhail Gorbachev has obviously felt the graveness of the
situation: in 1987 he spoke of Soviet society becoming unmanageable.
The political mentality behind secrecy and deception in Soviet politics was the
traditional Marxist-Leninist belief in the inevitable and all-encompassing confrontation
between the two socio-political system and the impending victory of Soviet communism.
Such ideas apparendy had a firm hold on the minds of the older generation of party officials.
As reported by a communist party official of the younger generation, even very recently his
seniors would seriously talk about the perspectives for world-wide triumph of communism
and their need "to be prepared to assume positions of responsibility in Europe, Asia, Africa
and America!"2 Yuriy Andropov was reported to have seen the situation in Afghanistan in
1979 through a 40-year old prism of the Spanish civil war, a confrontation between
communism and fascism,3 For holders of such views, the Soviet Union was not a part of a
whole world, but rather a separate world in itself, not bound with the "other" world by any
long-lasting common interest or values. Therefore, the Soviet elite operated in the belief that
deceiving that "other" world contradicted neither the values nor the interests of this elite.
The Soviet world view shows widening and deepening cracks. Several of its
previously unassailable postulates have been questioned by Gorbachev and his associates.
One casua ty has been Lenin's theory of imperialism, which described "monopoly
capitalism" as being in its last stage of development, ripe for revolutionary change into
communism. This concept was challenged by the then Party chief of ideology Vadim
Medvedev, who suggested that "monopoly capitalism" is actually the normal path for long-
term development of "capitalist" societies which gives them stability for the foreseeable
future. This automatically takes the transition from "capitalism" to "socialism" in free-
market nations out of the policy agenda.4
2Vladimir Bukhonin, First Secretary of the Sheksna District Party Committee of the Vologda Province,
"Zhiv li Chic likov?" Yunosf, 1>87, no. 10, p. 35.
3Artem Boro v ik, "Spryatannaya /oina," Ogonek, November 1-18, 1989, p. '9.
4V. Medvede ', "Velikiy Oktyal ' i sovremennyy mir," Kommunist, 1988, no. 2. pp. 6, 7.
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The concept of "class content" of Soviet foreign policy (that is, its strategic
orientation towards the promotion of communism) has been put in doubt by the idea of
"primacy of common human interests" in international politics. Politburo member and
Central Committee Secretary in charge of foreign policy (until July 1990), Aleksandr
Yakovlev, proposed that the Soviet policies should now be guided by "common sense,"
thus implying that the traditional Marxist-Leninist ideology is not a rational guide for
politics. 5 Gorbachev himself committed a monumental ideological heresy when he
described socialism as an "alternative" to capitalism, rather than as the latter's inevitable
successor. 6
Isn't the "new thinking" mostly a feint designed to gain the Soviets a breathing spell
and then to revert to their traditional policies, one may ask? The Soviets have been highly
conscious of the positive impact of adopting a common political language with Western
democracies. A former official of the Central Committee confirms this, but also says that
the "new thinking" reflects a genuine desire on the part of the Kremlin to pursue their
national interest rather than an ideological chimera.7
This question was also raised by Soviet commentators early in the Gorbachev era,
when Aleksandr Bovin compared today's Soviet foreign policy with that of Brest-Litovsk
peace treaty with Germany, signed by Lenin in order to gain time before ousting Germans
from areas of the Soviet Russia ceded to them by the treaty. Another well connected
foreign policy commentator, Fedor Burlatskiy, forcefully denied the analogy. 8
Nevertheless, some Western observers are raising the concern of a Soviet tactic along the
lines of the Brest Peace even today.9
5Cited in Vera Tolz, "The Soviet Union Retreats from Marxism-Leninism," Report on the USSR, October
20, 1989, p. 9.
6
"Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbacheva, " Pravda, November 5, 1987.
7Henry Hamman, "Soviet Defeclor on Origins of 'the New Thinking'," Report on the USSR, October 20,
1989, pp. 14-16.
8Aleksandr Bovin, "Surovaya shl ola Bresta," Izvestiya, September 20, 1987; Fedor Burlatskiy, "Optimizm
bez illyuziy," Literaturnaya gaze!
, December 2, 1987.
9John Lenczowski, "A Dash of .' epticism Wouldn't Hurt," The Los Ai %eles Times, January 1, 1990.
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The parallels with ihe Brest Peace Treaty are in fact rather superficial. Soviet
Russia signed that treaty because it was in desperate straits, but so was Germany, the other
signatory, whose resources vere hopelessly overstretched in World War I. Lenin gambled
on the likely German deft at and won. Whatever the economic, social and political
problems of the West toda> , its situation is beyond comparison with that of Germany in
1918. This contrast was no iced by one of today's most prominent Russian conservatives,
a man with close connections to the Soviet military establishment, Aleksandr Prokhanov.
He wrote that the 1917 Bobhevik revolution took place when the rest of the world was on
the brink of disaster. In constrast, today the USSR is sliding towards a similar cataclysm
while the rest of the developed world is thriving. 10
A good indication that "the new thinking" is more than a ploy can be found in the
reaction to it by traditional st elements in the communist party. "The manifesto" of the
traditionalists, published in the Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper in the form of a "letter"
from a Leningrad chemistry teacher on March 13, 1988, assailed the lack of "class content"
in foreign policy along with Gorbachev's other innovations. When Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze clear y placed "class content" below "common human interests" in
Soviet foreign policy, then Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Yegor
Ligachev contradicted him warning that such pronouncements confuse both the Soviet
public and allies. 11
10Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Tragediya tsentralizma est' tragediya prolitoy krovi..." Literaturnaya Rossiya,
January 5, 1990.
^Nina Andreeva, "Ne mogy postupit'sya printsipami," Sovetskaya Rossiya, March 13, 1988; "XIX
vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya KPSS: vneshnyaya politika i diplomatiya. Pravda. July 26, 1988; "Za delo-
bezraskachki." Pravda, August 6 1988.
Tsypkin
13
2. 2. Utility Of Military Force Questioned.
A group of policy-makers and policy-advisors associated with Mikhail Gorbachev
has expressed strong doubts about the utility of military force in today's world. Politburo
member and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has spoken against excessive reliance
on military force and against excessive concern about use of military force against the
Soviet Union; he warned that even an "overwhelming" military force "most frequently does
not yield the aggressor the results he counted on, and sometimes boomerangs against
him." 12 In a recent speech to the Supreme Soviet Shevardnadze plainly said that invasion
of Afghanistan was a mistake. 13 On December 4, 1989, the Soviet Union also
acknowledged that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was an error. 14
The relationship between the unhappy Soviet experiences in Afghanistan and the
new skepticism about the utility of military force is obvious. Throughout the first 62 years
of its existence, the Soviet regime applied military means for political ends with invariable
(albeit frequently very costly) success, from the civil war of 1918-1921 to World War II to
invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The failure of the invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 to achieve its political and military goals must have been an extremely
traumatic experience for the Soviet political elite and the military establishment and the
society as a whole. This is illustrated by the passions surrounding the subject of
Afghanistan in the debates at the Congress of People's Deputies in June 1989. The pro-
Gorbachev elements in the Soviet leadership said that the Soviet Army's withdrawal from
Afghanistan signaled the end to their country's direct military interventions in the Third
World. 15
12
"Doklad E. A. Shevardnadze," Vestnik MID, August 15, 1988, no. 15, p. 35.
u
rzvestiya, October 24, 1989.
14
"Prague 1968: Views Now in East Bloc," The New York Times, Dec mber 5, 1989.
15
"Doklad E. A. Shevardnadze," p. 39.
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A more skeptical attitude towards utility of military power was also engendered by
the case of Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe. Deployment of this new and powerful
weapon fit well with the requirements for Soviet military operations in that region. 16 But
the political clout gained from that deployment turned out to be insufficient to prevent the
counterdeployment of U.S. Pershing-2's and ground-launched cruise missiles. As a
result, what the Soviets refer to as "the second strategic front" against the USSR was
opened in Europe, presenting a new threat to Soviet command centers, and to the physical
safety.of the Soviet political elite itself. 17
Gorbachev and his associates appear to believe that the tremendous accumulation of
nuclear and conventional weapons undertaken by the Kremlin since the 1960's has failed to
achieve the main goal of their predecessors: ensuring the stability of communist political
systems in the USSR and her Warsaw Pact allies. It turned out, on the contrary, that the
diversion of huge resources to the military and the maintenance of the centralized war
economies contributed to the destabilization of communist regimes. The resulting internal
disintegration was the main security threat instead of the foreign enemy. 18
The fear of collapse of communist regimes became quite reasonable in the aftermath
of the rise of Solidarity in Poland in 1980-81, and the subsequent disintegration of the
communist system there, as well as in view of mounting Soviet economic difficulties. In
the "new thinking" the idea of the internal erosion of communist systems has been implied
in blaming the poor condition of the Soviet economy on the mistaken readiness of the
16Steven Meyer, "Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces. Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives," and
"Part II: Capabilities and Implications," Adelphi Papers, (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Winter 1983/84) nos. 187 and 188, passim.
17Doklad E. A. Shevardnadze," ] . 37.
18The realization of this change • .as first expressed in the Aesopian debate on "contradictions" in socialism.
That occurred in the wake of An ropov's accession to power. Some Soviet social scientists were concerned
with the possibility of a collapse of a Soviet-type regime as the result of its internal problems only without
military foreign interference. T it was a revis ; on of Stalin's thesis thai "socialism" in the USSR could be
destroyed only by outside milit: y force. Sec Ernst Kux. "Contra<1icii ns in Soviet Socialism," Problems
of Communism, November-Dec nber 1984. pp. 20 25.
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Kremlin to match all American military deployments, which, allegedly, were implemented
in order to exhaust the USS R.
Gorbachev's and his group's disenchantment with military force is quite obvious,
but the overall picture is contradictory and the long-term forecast is uncertain. Too much
reliance on military force is self-destructive, but can the Kremlin, lacking
economic and ideological clout, solve its political problems without a
credible military instrument? The whole edifice of the Soviet external (East
European) and internal empires has been built on an actual or threatened use of military
force. Many in Moscow have been left in a shock by the collapse of communist rule in
Eastern Europe virtually within four months (beginning with the formation of Solidarity-led
government in Poland) after it became clear that the Soviets would not use military force to
control internal events there. 19 While Gorbachev is making the best of it, one may doubt
his equanimity, especially when Moscow's rule is now being challenged along the ethnic
periphery of the Soviet Union itself, and the specter of a future German hegemony in
Eastern Europe is looming large on the political agendas from the White House to the
Kremlin.
The fear that the Soviets might revert to their old ways (with or without Gorbachev)
and use force against rebellious Union Republics has so far kept the latter within the Soviet
Union, but a skeptic might ask: how long will the mutual restraint last? Military force has
to be used with increasing frequency just to keep the Soviet Union together under
communist party control. Indeed, the threat to communist party control in Azerbaijan has
resulted in a massive use of military force in January 1990. In this political context, the
Soviet military policy, and the associated policies on glasnost' are likely to be
contradictory.
19For one of the first public reactions of shock see Prokhanov, "Tragedi a tsentralizma."
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2. 3. Secrecy and Soviet Politico-Economic Crisis
Pervasive secrecy has been a characteristic of the Soviet political system. Now
with this system itself under attack, the systemic obsession with secrecy has also come
under criticism-and glasnost' was born. As early as November 1985, Gorbachev sent a
memorandum to the Politburo urging more objective information on all issues and more
room for public criticism.20 An important event was the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster, when
the regime's clumsy silence and disinformation were responsible for damage to the Soviet
international standing and to Gorbachev's personal prestige, for wild rumors and
disorderly evacuation of endangered areas, and for further loss of the public's confidence
in the government. After the initial traditional reaction of trying to veil the disaster in
secrecy, the Kremlin allowed at least partially truthful coverage of the event, and allowed
access of Western experts and journalists.
In July 1988, the Politburo adopted a special resolution calling for the creation of
"information society" in the Soviet Union in order to reverse the Soviet growing lag behind
the non-communist world in information technology.21 Shortly afterwards the political and
theoretical party journal Kommunist published an article by Vladimir Rubanov, then
Department Head in the Scientific Research Institute of the KGB, in which he severely
criticized the Soviet "cult of secrecy."22 Given Rubanov's affiliation, some of his points
regarding the political context of Soviet secrecy are worth mentioning:
• The Soviet political culture is "obsessed" with secrecy as a
result of Stalinism.
20Victor Yasmann, "Glasnost" versus Freeedom oflnformation: Politic?! and Ideological Aspects," Report
on the USSR, vol. 1, no. 29, July 21, 1989, p.2.
21 Ibid., p. 4




• Because of this people react "painfully" to attempts to
reduce excessive secrecy.
• Existing excessive secrecy increasingly contradicts the new
political and economic realities; it further undermines the
public's trust in the government.
• Secrecy serves as a defense for the bureaucratic regime
unfettered by democratic institutions.
• As long as the division of the world into "socialist" and
"capitalist" systems persists, secrecy has its legitimate place
in protecting state interests, but the system of secrecy should
be significantly modified.
• Since the system of secrecy is primarily intended to protect
state interests against foreign opponents, it is logical to begin
"breaking the stereotypes" of secrecy in foreign policy area.
• Lack of information on the Soviet military is used by
"opponents" of disarmament for disinformation to "speed up
the arms race."
• The intern; tional community, according to Shevardnadze,
has a right italics by Rubanov) to be informed about the
true state of military affairs in any nation.
• Excessive secrecy impedes further mobilization of the
peace movement in the West, prevents Soviet diplomats,
political scientists and journalists from acquiring necessary
data to rebut "bourgeois" scholarship.
• Relaxation of secrecy in the military area should be
determined by "a principle of equal secrecy," i.e., reciprocity
in the level of openness between the Soviet Union and major
Western powers.
• Greater "openness" (otkrytost') in this area compared to the
level of "openness" in other nations would be compensated
for by "moral advantages" and support by "progressive
international public opinion."
• Relaxation of secrecy in the area of science and R&D
would result in the long-term in an improvement of Soviet
military capabilities due to intensified scientific and
technological progress.
Apparently at aboit the same time, a research program on secrecy and
classification regulations was initiated.23 Among the participants in this inter-agency
program were the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Council of Ministers (the
top coordinating body for the defense industry), the Institute of State and Law and other
institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State
Planning Commission (Gcsplan), the KGB, "and other agencies." The program was
23V. Rubanov, "Demokratiya i ' ^zopasnost' strany," Kommunist, July 1989, no. 11, p.55.
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apparently completed as planned by the end of 1989, and then presented to the government;
it has not made its way yet, however, to the Supreme Soviet. As a result of this program,
the Soviet media have made public for the first time some specifics of the system of state
secrets:
• While the KGB enforces the protection of state secrets, it
does not decide in every case what is secret and what is not.
• Such decisions are made by branch ministries based on
recommendations from lower levels of management.
• In this decision-making process the upper levels usually
follow the recommendations of the lower levels.
• Thus, there is no single body or person responsible for a
national policy of state secrets.
• There are rules for declassifying information as it becomes
dated~but the branch ministries ignore these rules most of
the time.
• This situation could be changed when a law on state
security is passed. Such a law would be developed by the
Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security
(KOGB—Komitet po voprosam oborony i gosudarstvennoy
bezopasnosti).24
Thus, all the shortcomings of existing secrecy rules ;ire blamed on the "stagnation"
of Soviet society, the self-imposed isolation of the Soviet Union, and the whipped up
hysteria about the "enemy," as well as the self-interest of the ruling elite. 25 Secrecy is an
important part of the political heritage and at least some Soviets in power want it shed.
The results of the work of the inter-agency research commission on secrecy confirm
that secretiveness is deeply ingrained in the Soviet political culture and institutions. The
commission had to confront the enormous dimensions of the problem. Up to seventy
percent of the so-called "normative acts" (sub-legal documents) which govern much of the
socio-economic activity in the Soviet Union are frequently in disregard or direct
^V. ZakharTco, "Grif 'sekretno' ' epokhu glasnosti," Izvestiya. April 28. 1989.
25Rubanov, "Demokratiya i bez< pasnost' strany,".p. 45.
Tsypkin
19
contravention to published laws.26 The research commission's report contains concrete
proposals on such diverse issues as a future law on state secrets, regulation of secrecy
between the state agencies and the state, cooperative and joint-venture industrial
enterprises, providing the personnel for enforcing the new secrecy regulations, the
relationship between secrec / and international cooperation and competition in science and
technology, etc.27
The commission esiablished several laudable principles for future regulations of
state secrets, such as the "principle of presumption of non-secrecy of information," the
"principle of equal openness and equal secrecy in international relations," the "priority of
international law" over the domestic laws in matters of state secrets, estimating the
economic loss from classifying information, declassification of information where the
likelihood of keeping it secret is relatively low, the priority of state interests over agency
interests, and the dependence of the term of duration of classification on the character of the
information.28
But, according to a Soviet author apparently involved in the program, a "number of
tasks set to to the ... program have not been accomplished for objective reasons." The
primary reason is that a law on state secrets has not been passed, which makes the
introduction of a new system for protecting and declassifying secrets impossible. It is also
impossible to introduce s ich a system until and unless it is known what kind of an
economic system the USSR will have.29 Regulation of state secrets in a primarily state-
owned economy is quite di ferent from that in a privatized one. It should also be said that
the declarations of sovereig ity by most of the Union republics, which establish the priority
of republican laws over the union laws, casts doubt on the effectiveness of a future USSR
law on state secrets.






The political context of present and future developments in all spheres of Soviet life
is the escalating erosion of traditional communist ideology and institutions. The
Communist leadership has publicly abandoned some important Marxist-Leninist dogmas.
The awakened society is ger erally indifferent to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism (except for
the concept of welfare state) and is increasingly questioning the legitimacy of the
communist party rule. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, a duality of power, the split
between the communist party and the Soviets (legislatures), is beginning to take shape.
Whatever happens now is necessarily an aspect of the transition of Soviet
society to some new, as yet undefined quality.
3. 0. SECRECY AND THE MILITARY.
3. 1. Secrecy in the Soviet Military Tradition.
A measure of secrecy in military operations and weapons development is
characteristic of most military establishments, but the Soviet Armed Forces have been
traditionally veiled in exceptional secrecy. Such policies are rooted in the events and
realities of the Soviet/Russian past and, historically periods of extreme secrecy gave way for
a time to partial openness.
It is frequently forgotten in the West that impenetrable secrecy has not always been
characteristic of the Soviet/Russian reality, including the military reality. Pragmatic
considerations have, from time to time, allowed for a degree of openness. The considerable
isolation from the West th ! Russia experienced until the end of the XVIIth century was
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replaced in the XVIIIth and XlXth centuries by varying degrees of openness to Europe.
That was considered necessary for the economic advancement of Russia.
The advent of communism did not immediately result in extreme secrecy in the
military. In the 1920's and until the mid-1930's, secrecy surrounding military activities was
less tight than it became in the late 1930's. Soviet military publications discussed matters of
military art and technology in a reasonably forthright manner.
German officers and engineers had numerous exposures to Soviet military affairs in
the process of extensive Soviet-German military and military-industrial cooperation. (The
Soviets needed this help to upgrade the quality of their officer corps and their military
technology.) In the course of this cooperation, which lasted until Hitler's coming to power
in 1933, German artillery engineers designed guns for the Red Army and trained Soviet
engineers. 30 In the same period the German military closely collaborated with the Red
Army practically in all areas of military activities. 31 Such exposures were not limited to
Germans only. A French aircraft designer, Paul Richard, worked in the Soviet Union on a
seaplane in the late 1920's. Among young Soviet engineers working as apprentices in his
shop were future chief designers; of ICBM's - Sergei Korolev; of helicopters - N. Kamov,
of seaplanes - G. Beriev; and of MIG fighters - M. Gurevich.32
Before World War II the Soviets, when politically necessary, allowed foreigners
some access to the Red Army and its weapons. While the Soviets were courting the British
and the French in order to avoid facing Nazi Germany on their own, they allowed Western
observers at their major troop exercise in the Kiev Military District in 1936, complete with
such innovations as paratroop landings.33 During World War II, in a moment of dire need,
the Soviets were ready to contemplate even the presence of Western troops on their territory
30Mikhail Tsypkin, The Origins of Soviet Military Research and Development System, 1917-1941 (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1985), pp. 135-136.
31John Erickson, The Soviet High Command (London: St. Martin's P^ess, 1962), pp. 247-282.




apparently integrated into the Soviet command structure. In October 1941 Stalin appealed to
Sir Winston Churchill to send British troops to fight against the Wehrmacht in the Soviet
Union! 34
It was in the course of World War II and in its aftermath that the patterns of secrecy
and deception prevalent until very recently developed in the Soviet Union. In planning
military operations, the Soviet high command and political leaders (mostly Stalin himself)
came to emphasize the value of deception impossible without the imposition of strictest
secrecy. The prime example of such deception is to be found in the 1945 Manchurian
campaign against Japan, which the Soviets view as the highest achievement of their military
art in World War II. In preparation for this campaign, the Soviets "undertook a major
transfer of forces from the western to the eastern part of the USSR under the complete cover
of a strategic deception plan."35
This pervasive secretiveness was also influenced by Stalin's resolve not to let the
outside world understand how weak was the Soviet Union which emerged from World War
II, and to counterbalance the potential impact of the exposure of millions of Soviet soldiers
to "capitalism" in Central Europe. The atmosphere of secretiveness and distrust of
foreigners was created by the late 1940's, accompanied by propaganda of the most vicious
and xenophobic brand of Russian chauvinism, complete with witch-hunts and spymania.
Secrecy was also important for enhancing the mystique of the Soviet regime. Then as now,
secrecy has also been necessary to hide from the potential opponents various material and
human weaknesses of the Soviet Armed Forces, a significant factor for a military
establishment historically used to the position of the underdog because of the
Soviet/Russian relative technological and economic backwardness.
34Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 197 1), p. 319.
35Notra Trulock III, "The Role of Deception in Soviet Military Planni ig," in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick
J. Parker, eds., Soviet Strategic Deception (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 1987V p. 283.
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The general inclination towards exaggerated secrecy has left a very strong imprint on
the military. It had its own specific reasons, in addition to those resulting from the
operational experience of World War II, for becoming extremely secretive. The memory of
the purge of the Red Army in the late 1930's, when tens of thousands of officers were
accused of espionage for foreign powers, gave the successive generations of officers a
knee-jerk reaction against disclosing any information as a matter of self-protection. During
World War II Stalin permitted very little contact between Soviet military officers and their
counterparts in the Alliance. Soviet officers learned the hard way that such contacts, even in
their official capacity, could bring them under suspicion. (Indeed, one of the characters in
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life ofIvan Denisovich is a Soviet navy officer
imprisoned because of his officially assigned wartime work with the Royal Navy.)
Such attitudes have survived in the Soviet society well into the 1980's. For
instance, during Yuriy Andropov's tenure as General Secretary (1982-1984) laws were
passed forbidding Soviet citizens to render help (such as overnight lodgings) to foreign
citizens and to share with them "professional" unclassified information.36
The advent of nuclear weapons and the Soviet experiences in 1941 have sharpened
the Soviet military's interest in the "initial period of war."37 If Germany armed with
conventional weapons nearly succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union thanks to a successful
employment of surprise, then a surprise attack with nuclear weapons could certainly bring
one of the two superpowers down to its knees! 38 New conventional weapons, if kept
secret, could also have an impact on the initial period of war critical for the final outcome of
the war.39 This logic certainly contributed to the Soviet emphasis on secrecy and strategic
36For the English text of the latter law, see Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. XXXVI, no. 8, p. 13.
3
'See, for instance, Army General S. P. Ivanov, Nachal'nyy period voyny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974)
passim.
38See Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1984), 3rd edition, p. 41; Marshal V. Sokolovskiy, ed., Voennaya strategiya (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1968) 3rd edition, p. 247; M. M. Kir'yan, Problemy voennoy teorii v sovetskikh nauchno-spravochnykh
izdaniyakh (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 124.
39Lt. General A. Yevseev, "O nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v izmenenii soderzhaniya i kharaktera nachal'nogo
perioda voyny," Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, Nove,ber 1985, no. 11, p. 17.
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deception, two categories closely interrelated in the Soviet military art. Strategic deception
is "carried out following decisions of the Supreme Command and includes a set of measures
aimed at protecting the secrecy of strategic operations and campaigns, as well as
disorienting the enemy in regard to the true intentions and actions of the armed forces."40
[Emphasis added.] A Soviet military defector insisted that programs of strategic deception
are managed a special Chief Directorate of Strategic Deception of the General Staff.41
Cloaking the military in a veil of secrecy also served an important political purpose.
As noted perceptively by some analysts, Soviet military might has played an important
domestic political role-that of conveying to the populace the idea of might of the Soviet
regime, of its overwhelming power.42 The power mystique was maintained for all its main
components—the communist party, the KGB and the military—by shrouding them in
secrecy, with their might occasionally and ritualistically revealed (e.g., at giant military
parades) to the citizenry.
Secrecy has also been prompted by self-interest of the military. No bureaucracy
likes the daylight, especially if it is has something to hide. The Soviet military have many
problems resulting from mismanagement. There are great and unjustified disparities in
standard of living between the members of the high command and the majority of the
officers. There is lack of fairness and excessive favoritism in the system of promotions,
etc., etc. All of this was conveniently hidden by military secrecy.
^Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-1980), vol. 5, p. 175.
41 Victor Suvorov, "GUSM: The Soviet Service of Strategic Deception," International Defense Review,
1985, no. 8, o. 1237.
42Rebecca V Strode and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of 5 >vict Military Power," Problems of
Communism, November-December 1981, p. 11.
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3. 2. Military Secrecy in Times of Change.
With the Marxist-Leninist ideology eroding, and the economy deteriorating,
Gorbachev has been trying to integrate the USSR with the rest of the world in order to
obtain economic benefits from cooperation with and greater openness to the West. He
appears to have learned the lesson of detente that it is in the long-term impossible to achieve
a significant level of such a cooperation without softening the traditionally threatening
Soviet military posture.
At the same time, in order to shake up the vast bureaucracy and make reforms
easier, Gorbachev permitted the public and media to criticize, sometimes harshly, various
institutions and agencies, including the armed forces. Both of these sets of policies
involved a change in established attitudes towards secrecy in the military. In addition, the
Soviets have recognized that excessive secrecy is poor for public relations at a time when
economic realities are demanding their improvement and arms control with the West
Glasnost' has its history in the Russian military tradition. After the defeat in the
Crimean war in 1855, the reformers of the Russian military establishment, led by the War
Minister Dmitriy Milyutin, intended to use glasnost' to improve the conditions of the
Russian military. They understood glasnost' as the right to discuss various problems of
the military and to volunteer unorthodox opinions, especially by junior officers, to benefit
the overburdened high command. This is close to the Soviet high command's view of
military glasnost'. At the same time the XlXth century Russian military reformers worried,
just as today's counterparts (see Section 3. 4.), that "incompetent" civilians would "abuse"
glasnost' in meddling in the affairs of the military.43
The application of glasnost' to the Soviet military establishment has followed two
different (although frequently crossing) tracks. The first track is that of new arms control
43A. Senin, "O pol'ze glasnosti,' Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, 1989, no. 4, pp. 63-65.
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and arms reduction policies, a part of Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign affairs. The
first obvious application of the "new thinking" to military affairs was in September 1986 at
the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe. The Soviets signed its final Document which contained numerous
provisions for limiting various military activities of European nations, East and West
through constraints, notification, and verification by foreign observers.44
On May 29, 1987 the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) released a communique
from its Political Consultative Committee, which proclaimed, among other things, a
defensive orientation for the Soviet and WTO military doctrines, and endorsed the concept
of intrusive and all-embracing on-site inspections for verification of future nuclear and
conventional arms control agreements.45 This proclamation paved the way for signing in
December 1987 of the INF Treaty with unprecedented provisions for on-site inspections of
military and military-industrial installations on both sides—as well as for a triumphant visit
by Mr. Gorbachev to the United States. Curtailing military secrecy has become a pre-
condition for Mikhail Gorbachev's important foreign policy successes. Anxious for further
improvement in their relations with the U.S., Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has
supported in general terms President Bush's proposal for "open skies" to increase
international trust and stability.46
The second track is that of public airing of problems in the Soviet military, such as
poor living conditions, poor technical skills of officers and enlisted men, poor morale,
hazing of conscripts, etc. This track is very much a part of the glasnost' campaign itself
on the domestic scene, the policy of exposing and reducing shortcomings and abuses in the
bureaucracy. The second track was apparent after the major embarrassment suffered by the
^John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference
(Washington: Pergamon-Brassey. 1988), pp. 221-237.
45Pravda, May 30, 1987.




Soviet military when a young West German pilot managed to land his Cessna on Red
Square in May of 1987.
In addition to agreeing to on-site inspections, the Soviets have begun to publish
some data on their military spending, the share of the military in the space budget, selected
tactical-technical characteristics of Soviet weapon systems, some maps without distortions,
etc. Western officials, experts and journalists have been granted selective access to
previously closely guarded military and military R&D facilities, such as the chemical
weapons plant at Shikhany, the Tyuratam space center, etc. (See below.)
This military glasnost' has generated very considerable positive publicity in the
West not because something drastically new has been learned so far, but because it looks
so favorable in contrast to the previous Soviet grim obsession with secrecy. In reailty,
obsessive, and even absurd, secrecy has by no means been purged from the Soviet
military. A handbook on rules of personal conduct distributed in 1989 to cadets in officer
schools suggests that when on liberty they "should not speak with strangers," "should not
discuss matters of life and work in the school" with civilians, and finding themselves in
trouble "ask for help ... only from officials."47 In such a context, the steps towards
military glasnost' do seem truly sensational.
The system of military secrecy is still very much in place. For example, the military
censorship continues to function as a department of the General Staff. (Symptomatically, it
is located in the same building with the editorial offices of the Soviet military journals.)
According to its commanding officer, Major General S. Filimonov, despite the relaxation
of secrecy, "It is easier to say what is forbidden for publication than what is permitted;"
i.e., the declassification apparently proceeds on a case-by-case basis. Further, he defines
"military secrets" as:
47S. Tarancn , "Moy ruki, kursa l!" Izvestiya, October 16, 1989.
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[I]nformation about the location of military units and groups
of units, although more than 150 garrisons are open for the
press. It is forbidden to disclose tables of troop
organization, aspects of combat readiness, secret samples of
weapons and military hardware.48
Until the introduction of the new Law on the Press on August 1, 1990, the Soviet
official press could not publish anything about the military without the prior approval of
military censorship.49 The situation is less clear now. The same Maj. Gen. Filimonov has
said that military censors will review already published materials, act
through law enforcement agencies to punish the mass media for giving
away military secrets, and "develop a standard document on the protection
of secrets in the mass media." In short, he would issue the kind of
paralegal acts which until now have contributed greatly to maintenance of
excessive secrecy and the concealment of information.50
Although some accurate maps have been printed, there are many limitations on
further publications. According to the the chief of the Military Topography Department of
the General Staff, Major General A. I. Losev, the military are against declassifying
topographic maps of scale 1 : 100,000 and larger because it would be too difficult and costly
for a foreign power to recreate such maps on its own and because satellite photography
does not permit establishing the exact location of objects photographed without such maps.
Gen. Losev also defended continuing the classification of some XVIIIth century and even
earlier maps for military reasons! 51
The pressure for change, however, has apparently left the military censorship
somewhat disoriented. For instance, in a recent interview Soviet navy C-in-C ADM
Chernavin referred to the new Tbilisi "aircraft carrier," now being outfitted in the Black
4
^V. Litovkin, "Voennaya tsenz ira: chto mozhno i chego nel'zya," fzvestiya, November 26, 1989.
49Ibid.
50Maj. Gen. S. Filimonov, "Staj it li tsenzory bezrabotnymy?" Krasnava zvezda, July 12, 1990.
5W. Zyubin, "Raskroem karty,' Krasnaya zvezda, July 22, 1989.
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Sea. Pravda published his statement despite the fact that it was bound to create diplomatic
difficulties for the Soviet Jnion. The Montreaux Convention bans passage of aircraft
carriers via the Turkish straits. In several days Pravda had to publish a lame "correction,"
calling the Tbilisi "a heavy aircraft carrying cruiser."52
The reform of the c assification code is to make it more modern, not to abolish it.
The military has not ended its traditional inability to discriminate between verification of
arms control agreements ar d espionage.53 The Ministry of Defense daily newspaper has
warned that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency is using glasnost' for gathering
information about the Soviet Armed Forces and included in the same context verification
activities related to the INF Treaty. The same article, characteristically entitled Perestroika,
Glasnost' ... Espionage, expresses concern about alleged American emphasis on human
intelligence because intelligence gathered by national technical means (NTM) is insufficient
for a well rounded assessment of such factors as personnel quality and morale, as well as
of weapon.4 still on the drawing board.54 This implicitly counterbalances the notion
(present in "the new thinking") that the development of NTM has made secrecy itself
obsolete, and serves as a reminder that personal contacts between Soviet military personnel
and the U. S. arms control inspectors are a source of danger and must therefore be strictly
monitored to prevent a leakage of "secrets."
The article also expresses concern about "excessive glasnost'," when Soviet
scientists and scholars allegedly simply give away to American participants at various
conferences information which "is highly useful for a smart specialist." This remark is
particularly interesting because it broadens the interpretation of what is a secret instead of
narrowing it down, as "the new thinking" suggests. Rather than treating a secret as
52V. N. Chernavin, "Kommentariy Glavnokomanduyushchego Voenno-Morskim Flotom strany admirala
flota V. N. Chernavina ," Pravda Octoberl9, 1989; for the "correction" see Pravda, October 22, 1989.
530n this traditional approach, *ee Mikhail Tsypkin, Why Wouldn't the Soviets Cheat in Arms Control?
(Arlington, VA: System Planning Corp., 1987), pp,IH-9, III- 10.
54V. Doronin, "Perestroika, glasnost' ... shpionazh," Krasnaya zvezda, May 11, 1989.
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something clearly designated as such, this approach moves backward to the typical Soviet
"whatever is not expressly permitted, is forbidden," and to Andropov's law (mentioned
earlier) making communication of professional unclassified information to foreigners a
crime.
Concern about protection of military secrecy under conditions of glasnost' has also
been voiced by KGB Majo" General I. Ustinov. In a recent interview he gave numerous
examples of alleged American intelligence gathering activity by NTM. Gen. Ustinov
demanded that industrial ministries and agencies, individual workers and scientists evaluate
specific needs for protecting their secrets and follow the rules for handling secrets without
any deviations.55 Similar attitudes have been expressed even more forcefully by the Soviet
Navy's monthly Morskoy Snornik, which has recently attacked every and any activity that
gives or might give the We? t access to truthful information about the Soviet military: from
Western visits to Soviet military facilities, to the publication of articles on military morale in
Soviet newspapers, to frank discussions of the MIKE submarine disaster in the mass
media, to greater freedom of travel and emigration.56
Such concerns conflict with a statement made recently by Gen. Yazov, who
proposed that East and West move towards "transparency (transparentnost') in the military
field-that is, the maximum possible openness..."57
3. 3. Military Glasnost' and the West: Some Case Studies.
The Soviets have permitted on-site inspection of facilities associated with
destruction, deployment and production of missiles under the INF Treaty. Some of the
55Yu. Dmitriev, "I vse zhe nas podslushivayut," Trud, October 11, 1989.
56Col. V. Nikolaev, "Glasnost
1
i tayna," Morskoy sbornik, 1990, no. 7 pp. 8-10.




information disclosed in the process (deployment areas and basing patterns) is largely
irrelevant because the missiles in question will no longer be deployed, and because access
to former deployment areas will hardly reveal much that satellite intelligence has not. Still,
inspectors' access to production facilities and observations of deployment areas are likely to
help U.S. intelligence in the detection of possible future non-compliance by the Soviets.
The much greater concern Df the Soviets, however, might be (a) contacts between Soviet
and American military personnel and (b) possible constraints on obvious changes in
activities by defense industrial enterprises where U.S inspectors are stationed or can pay a
surprise visit.
In this case, the Soviets are not giving away any existing important secrets, but
rather exposing to considerable stress their well established habits of shielding their military
from Western contacts, and operating their defense industry without constraint. The great
importance of INF Treaty for Soviet national interest (as understood by Gorbachev and his
group) is that it removed the remnants of an unsuccessful military-political operation (the
SS-20 deployment and associated "peace movement" activities) from the international
scene. Moreover, the Soviet concessions in matters of U. S. access are a bit less dramatic
than they seem at first glance: a) current conversion of the defense industry is likely to
make at least some defense factories less "secret" anyway; and b) the 13 years during
which inspections will be permitted might seem a long time to Americans who are used to
short cycles between change (four years between presidential elections, frequent moves
from one locale to another, wide fluctuations of the business cycle, etc.), but not to Soviets
who, until recently, have been used to a slow pace of change. It should also be noticed that
the term of 13 years must be also close to the average term for research-to-production cycle
for new Soviet weapons. The decision to build the first Soviet aircraft carrier, the Tbilisi,
which began operational tests in 1989, was made in 1976-thirteen years ago.58 By the
"Chemavin, "Kommentariy Gla nokomanduyushchego."
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time the new generation of weapons being conceived now reaches the assembly line and
political-military objectives of the INF Treaty are fulfilled, the U.S. will no longer be able
to inspect selected defense production facilities.
Under the policy of military glasnost', the Soviets have recently given, on a
unilateral basis, access to Soviet military facilities to Western officials, experts and
journalists outside of the framework of any existing arms control treaty. Let us look
closely at several such recent cases of access. In July 1989 a group of U.S. Congressmen
and "independent scientists" were allowed to visit the Sary Shagan BMD proving ground.
There they saw a Soviet laser which the visitors described (contrary to what had been
suggested by several earlier editions of the Department of DefenseSov/ef Military Power )
as incapable of damaging U.S. satellites, antiquated and relatively primitive. One of the
visiting scientists, the Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel, said that the laser had very
outdated computers and was so crude that "a two-year college in the United States could
produce the same in one of its laboratories."59
The American visitors to the laser installation did not get answers to any of their
specific questions (when exactly was the laser designed and built? how could the Soviets
amplify their claim that it is to be used only for satellite tracking?). They were not allowed
to visit any other installations in the area and did not have their questions answered about
such installations. How useful was the visit? One should not be too quick to denigrate the
capabilities of Soviet weapons only because they look shoddy and use some hardware
obsolete by American standards. Making capable (although less so than the best Western
counterparts) systems out of inferior components has been the trademark of the Soviet
military R&D system for decades. Indeed, if we are to believe Academician Yevgeniy
Velikhov, the Soviet laser was of the same type as the one recently used by the U.S. Air
Force to track space objects, and the Soviets used their laser for the same purpose last
59R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Las r Said to Pose No Threat," The Wash igton Post, July 9, 1989.
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year. 60 As for the outdated computers, a 1985 publication by the U.S. Department of
Defense made it quite clear that the Soviet BMD effort is seriously hampered by lack of
advanced computer technology. 61 Confirming this assessment based on NTM data has
been undoubtedly useful, but the visit has apparently done little to increase our
understanding of the direction of Soviet BMD research and development.
Another visit by American specialists to a classified gas laser facility at a branch of
the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy had similar results. The Americans concluded
that the Soviet laser, which blasted a sheet of metal in their presence, had an impressive
power level, but little direct military significance. 62 This observation supports the
statements made nearly five years ago by the Department of Defense, which credited the
Soviet gas laser with "impressive" output power, and dated possible deployment of laser
weapons not earlier that the late 1990's—early 2000's. The implication was that currently
available Soviet gas lasers have no direct military significance.63 Soviet scientists at the
facility said that the visit was arranged to reassure the West that the Soviets were interested
in peaceful rather than military applications of lasers, that nevertheless the gas laser was
paid for by the Ministry of Defense, that the scientists at the Kurchatov Institute were
skeptical about the military utility of the gas laser, but that the military did not believe [the
scientists'] words."64
These claims by Soviet scientists might be true, but they as well might not. Does a
branch of the Kurchatov Institute build lasers only to prove to the military, which does not
believe "words," that they are poor weapons? Is this what the military is paying for? Will
the laser laboratory continue to accept military contracts despite the scientists' skepticism?
60Ibid.
^Soviet Strategic Defense Programs (Department of Defense, October 1985), p. 16.
62Michael E Gordon, "U.S. Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing," The New York Times, August 17, 1989.
^Soviet Strategic Defense Pro}, rams, pp. 13, 14.
^Gordon, "U.S. Visitors See S< viet Laser Firing."
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What is happening in a lab next door? Indeed, the Soviet scientists "did not discuss in
detail their work on chemical or free electron lasers..."65
Since such questions were not answered, the visit to the laser lab at the Kurchatov
Institute did not resolve our concerns about the Soviet military laser program, although it
confirmed U.S. intelligence data. It should also be noted that the American request to visit
a Soviet laser facility near the city of Dushanbe in Central Asia, which has been a source of
much concern to the U.S., was rejected, a curious fact given that the Soviets have insisted
that this facility is for peaceful purposes only.66
An American group that visited a command center of the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces was surprised to find out that it was only 20 feet underground. (The 1988 edition
of Soviet Military Power by the U.S. Department of Defense provided detailed descriptions
of super-hardened and super-deep Soviet Supreme Command nuclear war underground
facilities. After that, could the Soviets really doubt that the outdated SS-11 command
center's depth was a secret from the U.S.?) Indeed, the Americans were allowed to visit
only a command center for the ageing SS-ll's, which are being retired, and the Soviet
military officers refused to discuss any other types of missiles and any arrangements for
them. The Americans could also not tell how many missiles were deployed at the missile
field which they visited.67 Given the careful observation of activities associated with
Soviet ICBM's by U.S. NTM in order to verify compliance with existing arms control
agreements and to prepare data for future ones, one might suspect that the American
visitors to the SS-11 command center did not learn any new and important facts. There
was one exception: the Soviets tried hard to reassure the U.S. about the Soviet launching
65Ibid,
66Michael E. Gordon, "Congressional Visitors Learn Limits on Glasnost," The New York Times. August
28, 1989. On the laser facility near Dushanbe, see William J. Broad, "New Clues on a Soviet Laser
Complex," The New York Times, October 23, 1987.
67Gordon, "I IS. Visitors See Soviet Laser Firing."
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procedures. They were at pains to show that these procedures exclude unauthorized
release.68
During a visit of a U.S. Congressional delegation to the Sevastopol naval base on
the Black Sea, a Soviet admiral "disclosed," in the words of an American newspaper
report, "significant details"about the Tbilisi aircraft carrier then readied for sea trials. It is
to have catapults for launching jets, will not be nuclear powered, and will probably carry
SU-27 FLANKER jets. 69 These disclosures, however, hardly enhanced the state of U.S.
knowledge on the subject. The 1987 edition of Soviet Military Power suggested that the
Tbilisi will be equipped with catapults and probably carry FLANKER'S on the basis of
observation of Soviet activities at Saki naval airfield near the Black Sea. The same
publication, normally not given to ignoring anything that increases Soviet power projection
capabilities, did not mention the possibility of nuclear propulsion for the Tbilisi, which
suggests that its conventional propulsion had been no secret from U.S. intelligence even
then.70 When the Congressional delegation, however, asked for permission to visit the
Nikolaevsk shipyard, where the Tbilisi is being outfitted, and where other major surface
combatants are built, the request was denied.71
A similar example concerns letting Western journalists visit a "secret" city which
has served as the center of Soviet nuclear weapons industry. Its reactor facilities are going
to be closed, the technology used there is not secret from the United States, and the location
of the city" is not "secret". There is a similar pattern in a 1988 visit to the Shikhany
chemical weapons factory. The Soviets must have assumed that the West knew about the
facility (just as the location of a biological weapons facility in Sverdlovsk, made famous by
an anthrax outbreak there was no secret to the West). The West also knew that the Soviets
6SIbid.
69Gordon, "Congressional Visitors Learn Limits on Glasnost."
10Soviet Military Power 1987 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Mar h 1987), p. 86.
71Gordon, "Congressional Visitors Learn Limits on Glasnost."
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produce chemical weapons, and had a general knowledge of what kind of chemical
weapons are most widespread in the Soviet arsenal.
Thus, the Soviets are allowing Western access to their military "secrets"
• When Western intelligence services already have
substantial information on the subject or are likely to obtain
such information in the future;
• When revealing information advances Soviet national
interests, helps deflate Western estimates or at least
strengthen the Soviet public relations position;
• When a visit can really NOT help the West come to any
definite conclusion about Soviet capabilities beyond what the
West already knows.
A prime example is the 1988 visit by an American Congressional delegation to the
site of the much debated Krasnoyarsk large phased array radar. Some conclusions
reportedly drawn by the American visitors were irrelevant to the central issue, namely that
the radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty, as finally confirmed by the Soviets in 1989.
The radar did not look hardened for battle-management. How could they know for sure
since it was only half-finished? The workmanship looked shoddy—but what Soviet
workmanship doesn't? Indeed, those American visitors who came away believing
(correctly) that the radar was a violation, did so because of the north-eastern orientation of
the radar and its location deep inside the Soviet territory, which made it unsuitable for
anything but an ABM mission.72 Such information, however, had been provided years
earlier by American satellite intelligence.
72William J. Broad, "Inside a Key Russian Radar Site: Tour Raises Questions on Treaty," the New York
Times, September 7, 1987; William J. Broad, "Soviet Radar on Display, the New York Times, September
9, 1987; David K. Shipler, "An ericans Who Saw Soviet Radar I Insure If It Violates Pact," the New York
Times, September 9, 1987.
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3. 4. Military Glasnost' and Deception.
Can deception be carried out under the cover of the military glasnost"! Several
factors require analysis here: the Soviet political culture, the military's attitudes to the role
of deception in military affairs, and the ability of the Soviet public itself to obtain
information on military matters.
Despite Gen. Yazov's professed desire for military transparency, and despite the
increased potential of technical intelligence, the Soviet military apparently has not written
deception off altogether. A lengthy review of the latest deception means allegedly
developed by the U. S. Armed Forces, published by the Ministry of Defense daily, ignores
a point, so important to "the new thinkers," that deception is destabilizing. The implication
of the article entitled The Trojan Horses of the Pentagon is that deception is an integral part
of military training and weapons acquisition (after all, the Greeks won the Trojan war
thanks to their use of this means of deception!)73
Military glasnost' cannot exclude deception and under certain circumstances may
even facilitate it. Military glasnost' is likely to reduce Western suspiciousness and desire
to question Soviet behavior in every minimally ambiguous instance. Military glasnost'
practiced together with a series of arms control agreements overextends the Western
intelligence/verification capabilities (something the Soviet have already noticed).74 The
need to observe so many Soviet facilities and activities combined with the improved
"atmospherics" and defense budget cuts may limit the ability of the West to look at activities
and facilities beyond the glasnost'/arms control framework, which opens up possibilities
for deception.
But how likely are the Soviets to conduct a program of strategic deception (that is, a
series of activities to change the Soviet-American correlation of forces in the Kremlin's
73V. Trofimov, "Troyanskie koni' Pentagona," Krasnaya zvezda, March 3, 1989.
74Doronin, "Perestroika, glasnost' ... shpionazh."
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favor) now? Until very rec mtly they were engaged in a program of strategic deception to
obtain an edge in ballistic missile defense over the United States via construction of the
Krasnoyarsk radar. Having admitted the illegality of this activity, the Soviets, in effect,
admitted a failure of this strategic deception program which had succeeded only in
mobilizing the United State > for the Strategic Defense Initiative and had made the Soviets
confront their own technological and economic weakness when contemplating a BMD race
against the U.S. This case hardly encourages them to begin new strategic deception
programs now. For such a program, one needs a strategy—and that the Soviets lack in the
whirlwind of barely controlled political change of today. The strategic confusion of the
Soviet political-military leadership makes a long-term plan of strategic deception unlikely,
but it also creates conditions for misunderstanding or deception capable of straining
international relations in the future. The Soviet "defensive doctrine" is a case in point.
3. 4. 1. Military Glasnost' and Defensive Doctrine.
In the past, the Soviet declaratory doctrine differed widely from the reality of their
operational planning on several significant occasions. Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet top
politicians proclaimed nuclear war to be unwinnable. But now we are told by no less a
figure than Dr. Vadim Zagladin, for many years Deputy Chief of International Department
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, that all these years the Soviet Union,
although certainly not looking for an opportunity to fight a nuclear war, made its military
plans on the basis "of a possibility of victory in a nuclear war."75 In the same period, the
Soviets denied that they were seeking world military hegemony. But in 1986 Mr.
Gorbachev criticized Soviet military policy of his predecessors as seeking to match the
75
"Vneshnyaya politika i perestroyka," hvestiya, June 27, 1988.
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combined military power ol "any possible coalition" that is, of the United States, Western
Europe, Japan and China--vhich is a quest for global military domination.76
Today Western analysts are faced with a puzzle of Gorbachev's "defensive"
military doctrine: a concept which presupposes that neither party to a possible conflict has
enough forces to attack bu both have sufficient military strength to defend themselves.
There appears to be a relationship between "the defensive doctrine" and military glasnosf.
Secrecy is destabilizing, according to the new thinking, because it creates
v
a fear of attack,
something which the defensive doctrine is supposed to dispel.77 Since the Soviets are
already making some unilateral steps towards defensive military posture (reduction of
forces and of content of tanks in the forces, elimination of bridging and assault equipment
in Eastern Europe) without demanding changes in the NATO force posture, the underlying
Soviet assumption must be, as proposed by some Soviet civilian analysts, that the danger
of conventional invasion of the USSR from the West is practically non-existent.78
The defensive doctrine, however, might become a source of misunderstanding at
best, and deception at worst in the Soviet-American security relationship. The Soviet High
Command appears to be confused about the meaning of defensive doctrine. According to
the Chief of General Staff Army General M. Moiseev, a shift to defensive doctrine involves
"giving the Armed Forces a non-offensive structure: maximum limitation within [the Armed
Forces] of strike weapon systems; change of the orientation of deployment areas towards
the implementation of strictly defensive tasks; reduction of the mobilization plans of the
Armed Forces, as well as of volume of military production."79
76Cited in "Doklad E. A. Shevardnadze," p. 36.
77See, for instance, Shevardnadze, "General'nyy zamysel--mir," and A Kokoshin, "Razvitie voennogo dela i
sokrashchenie vooruzhennykh sil i obychnykh vooruzheniy," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye
otnosheniya, 1988, no. 1, p. 28.
78See V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov, A. Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti-starye i novye," Kommunist,
1988, no. 1, 44-46.
79Army Gen. M. Moiseev, "Sovetskaya voennaya doktrina: realizatsiya ee oboronitel'noy napravlennosti,"
Pravda, March 13, 1989.
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At first look this definition seems to be straightforward enough. But statements by
Soviet high-ranking milit; ry officers and defense industry executives testify to the
problems they have understi nding the implications of defensive doctrine. Take the concept
of defensive sufficiency. In a September 1989 speech, no less a figure than the Soviet
Minister of Defense Army General Dmitriy Yazov warned against forgetting the experience
of the Nazi invasion of 194 ("We should not allow its repetition."), and continued: "...we
must have not only sufficient but also unconditionally reliable defense..."80
[Emphasis added.] But what kind of defensive sufficiency and related military openness
can be practiced if you anticipate an all-out attack and want to have an absolute military
guarantee of repelling it?!
Take the concept of defensive character of military strategy. Gen. Moiseev says
that in the initial period of war Soviet operations will be defensive in nature, although
the enemy would not be allowed to have the initiative.81 [Emphasis added.] The apparent
implication is that once the initial period of war is over, and the enemy is stopped, the
Soviet forces would go on an offensive. Still, the forces required for the eventual
offensive might have to be structured and armed accordingly, which would contradict the
proclaimed defensive restruc turing of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Even more confusing is the concept of eliminating the "strike weapons" with
outstanding offensive characteristics. Soviet navy C-in-C Fleet Admiral Chernavin, for
instance, proclaimed the first true Soviet aircraft carrier, Tbilisi, to be a defensive weapon:
...when we are asked today whether building aircraft carriers
contradicts our defensive doctrine, my answer is: no. We
see their main mission as carrying fighter aircraft, which can
provide cover to our ships at a great distance where shore-
based fighter aviation is of no help. This defensive mission
is integral to the new Tbilisi aircraft carrier...But what does
defensive mean? Some people understand it in a simplistic
and primitive way. They think that once we have adopted
80Army Gen. D. T. Yazov, "Am yadruzhby i bratstva narodov," Krasnaya zvezda, September 22, 1989.
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such a doctrine, we can be only a passive side, to be on the
defensive, to retreat in case of conflict into the depth of our
territory. But modern war—on land, at sea, and in the air~is
above all the war of maneuver. How can a combat ship fight
while "sitting in a trench?" A submarine must find and sink
the enemy. The mission of surface ships is, when
necessary, tD launch missile strikes against the enemy
without waiti ng for him to enter our territorial waters.82
Chernavin's statement illustrates the predicament the Soviet military finds itself in
trying to determine which lypes of operations and weapons are defensive. Some Soviet
spokesmen betray open self-interest in their definitions. For instance, a deputy general
designer of the Tupolev ai craft "firm," A. Kandalov, described the TU-160 Blackjack
strategic bomber as a defensive weapon because it has been allegedly designed "as a
counterweight" to the American B-l strategic bomber! 83
These examples do not mean that the defensive doctrine is planned as
a strategic deception of the West. They rather indicate the degree of confusion
among Soviet military plan lers about the nature of the new doctrine they are supposed to
implement, and their genera' reluctance to give much more than a lip service to the new idea
which runs against their coi porate interests because it leads to force reductions and cuts in
weapons acquisitions. A possible future consequence of this confusion/reluctance might be
that the Soviets will end up concealing non-compliance with some of their own more far-
fetched pledges of "defensive restructuring" made in arms control negotiations or
unilaterally to provide more ammunition to Gorbachev's diplomatic offensive.
The following anecdote related by the Ministry of Defense daily illustrates the
predicament presented to both the Soviets and the West by the defensive doctrine.:
When NCO Staroverov was asked by a BBC reporter
[during a visit by NATO inspectors accompanied by
journalists] whether his subunit was training according to the
new doctrine, he initially ... said: "No, everything is as it
82 Chemavin, "Kommentariy Gl; vnokomanduyushchego."
83V. Izgarshev et al., "Oni ostav vayut avtografy v nebe," Pravda, August 18, 1989.
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was." And only when he understood what was meant, he
started explaining that we have always paid great attention to
defense and did not plan to attack anyone.84
It is difficult for the Soviets to avoid such embarrassments, but it is even more difficult for
the West to figure out whether such an embarrassment is rooted in confusion—or in
deception.
3. 4. 2. Glasnost', Deception and Soviet Military Press.
The confusion in Soviet military thinking might be responsible for a curious lull in
military publishing activity. Throughout the 1980's, the Soviet military put out a
substantial number of books dealing with various aspects of military doctrine and strategy.
These books without exception were characterized by a typical hard-line world view, a
poorly concealed recognition of the validity of nuclear war-fighting, and by an emphasis on
the role of Soviet military power in East-West relations and in Third World crises.85 From
the mid-1988, this stream suddenly and inexplicably dried up. Throughout 1987 and 1988
the military periodicals hotly (and not always favorably) debated various aspects of the
defensive doctrine, but by 1988 these debates seem to have been silenced. Is it possible
that the Soviets have begun to classify their military writings in order to avoid embarrassing
Gorbachev's diplomacy and to deceive the West about the real direction of Soviet military
thought, quite different from the postulates of the "new thinking"?
84N. Panyukov, "Praporshchik Staroverov otvechaet B-bi-si," Krasnaya zvezda, April 23, 1989.
85Just to list a few: M. A. Garecv, Frunze—voennyy teoretik (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1885); N. V. Ogarkov,
Istoriya uchit bditel'nosti (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985); S. A. Tyushkevich, Voyna i sovremennost'
(Moscow: Nauka, 1986); Yu. Kirshin et al., Politicheskoe soderzhanie sovremennykh voyn (Moscow:
Nauka, 1987); V. T. Login et al. Opyt voyn v zashchitu sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (Moscow: Nauka,
1985); S. I. Radzievskiy, ed., Mi tarism-ugroza miru i tsivilizatsii (Moscow: Nauka, 1987): P. A. Zhilin,
ed., Istoriya voennogo iskussu i (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986); F. F. Gayvorosnkiy, ed., Evolyustiya
voennogo iskusstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987); N. P. Vyunenko et al., Voenno-morskoy flot: roV
,
perspektivy razvitiya, ispol'zovan ' (Moscow:Voenizdat, 1988).
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The Soviets are obviously aware that their doctrinal writings may (and sometimes
do) cause a stir in the West. The Ministry of Defense daily angrily denounced the
conclusions about the continuing Soviet interest in nuclear warfighting drawn by the
French Sovietologist Alain Besancon from several recent books written by Soviet military
officers. 86 It is impossible to guarantee that the current silence is not the sign of a
deception scheme. The Soviet military is a bureaucracy shell-shocked by the pace of events
in the Soviet empire. The absence of major published research on the military doctrine is
most likely the result of the general confusion, and negative feelings, among the military
concerning Gorbachev's dortrinal innovations, and the only sensible alternative to directly
challenging the General Secretary, who has recently fired a Minister of Defense and
removed all Marshals of the Soviet Union (except for Defense Minister Yazov) from actual
policy-making positions.
The Soviets have rec ently opened to foreign subscription the monthly journal of the
General Staff, Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), previously circulated for official use
only. This action, in line with other declassification steps taken by the Soviets, is not as
bold and altruistic as it might seem: the Soviets must have known that the U.S. intelligence
community has regulary obtained Voennaya Mysl' (because large selections of translations
from that periodical had been published by the U.S. government) and lately (since 1973)
kept it to itself. Now the intelligence community will have to contend with interpretations
of the latest Soviet doctrinal pronouncements by any academic who has invested $45 in an
annual subscription to the journal. Still, the Voennaya Mysl' of the era of military
glasnost' is likely to becom ; less informative than its restricted predecessor: "They'll spoil
the journal and turn in into something like the Journal ofMilitary History" was a comment
of a retired Soviet general now at an Academy of Sciences research institute to an analyst at
86Lt. General V. Serebryanniko\ , "Fal'shivka s dal'nim pritselom," Krasnaya zvezda, Hovember 1, 1987.
Two Soviet books in question ;ive been referenced above: Tyushkevich, Voyna i sovremennost' , and
Kirshin et al., Politicheskoe sodi zhanie sovremennykh voyn .
Tsypkin
44
Rand corporation.87 (The Journal ofMilitary History published by the Ministry of Defense
deals with of contemporary military issues in a very indirect way, usually by allusion to
historical examples.)
3. 4. 3. Deception in Science and Military R&D.
One of the postulates of the "new thinking" is that military strength is becoming
increasingly dependent on the pace of scientific and technological developments rather than
on numbers of men and stockpiles of weapons. The military appears to have in principle
agreed with this position. 88 TTie importance of protecting secrets in science and technology
was emphasized in 1989 by the then Chairman of the Committee on Defense and State
Security of the Supreme So\ iet Prof. Vladimir Lapygin. (On this committee, see below.)
It is in the area of science and research and development that preservation of secrecy
makes deception possible. As a Soviet military author notes, "the intertwining of research
and development, design, assembly and testing ... makes it possible to camouflage even
more thoroughly the real military expenditures in the budgets of 'civilian' agencies."89
(The Soviet author referred o alleged practices of the United States, but this appears to be
the classical stylistic devic ; in Soviet military writings of pointing at the U. S. while
discussing the USSR.)
Such dangers were foreseen by the late Dr. Andrei Sakharov, who expressed
concern in one of his last interviews about "very, very many [future weapons] which are
still kept in the labs without anyone even knowing anything about them." Sakharov noted
that "a ban on research and development can never be possible and effective," and
87Information provided by an analyst with Rand Corp.
88
"DokJad E. A. Shevardnadze," p. 36; Col. S. A. Bartenev, Ekonomicheskoe protivoborstvo v voyne
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), p. 8
89Bartenev, Ekonomicheskoe pr uvoborstvo, pp. 113, 114.
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suggested that military R&D projects "become open as soon as their development reaches a
certain level."90 Indeed, as some Soviet civilian academic analysts point out, no informed
public debate on military affairs can take place as long as there are no data published on
weapons acquisition programs, including future weapons.91 A reformist People's Deputy
and member of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security writer Vasil'
Bykov, has already warned that the conversion of the Soviet defense industry is
"hypocritical verbiage behind which certain circles are planning new armaments
programs."92 Member of the Presidential Council, Aleksandr Yakovlev, has said that the
the defense industry is the focus of resistance to change and continues to enjoy its
privileged status even amidst today's economic crisis.93
The United States should be aware of the clear limitations of glasnost' when it
comes to science and military R&D, as well as the potential for deception in this area.
Indeed, it was shown earlier that the least conclusive and revealing of all the military
glasnost' activities were those involving access to R&D facilities .
3. 4. 4. Glasnost', Deception and Political Culture.
The Soviet political culture, embodied in the attitudes, decision-making patterns and
habits of thought of the Soviet elite, is a very important factor in determining the parameters
of military glasnost'. A former scholar at the KGB Research Institute recently said that the
political culture of the Soviet elite has been shaped by the elite's "usurpation" of political
power from the "masses. " As a result the former find it necessary to monopolize all
90Grigoriy Tsitrinyak,"Stepen' svobody," Ogonyok, 1989, no. 31, p. 29.
91 See, for instance, Aleksei I/yumov, "Voennoy glasnosti ne khvataet otkrovennosti," Moskovskie
novosti, September 10, 1989.
92Vasil' Bykov, "Prorok v svoeni otechestve," Moskovskie novosti, February 18, 1990.
93Radio Liberty Daily Report, n ). 186 September 28, 1990.
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channels of information. Keeping the "masses" uninformed is "a crucial condition for the
covert realization of [the elite's] political interests."94 (The author of this quote was fired
from the KGB after publishing an article calling for removal of many secrecy barriers in
Soviet society—a fine illustration of the importance of secrecy to the elite's political
culture!)95 Thus secretiveness and deception are integral to the political culture of the
Soviet elite. This political culture, as Gorbachev has noted on a number of occasions,
cannot be changed overnight.
Of course, the Sovi Jt bureaucracy does not hold a world monopoly on deception
and cover-ups in the of nat onal security and other spheres. What makes the Soviet case
outstanding among developed nations, however, is the combination of elite arrogance when
it comes to handling information and the lack of Russian/Soviet tradition of the rule of law
and of a government accoui table to the public. "Until the 1860s Russian jurisprudence did
not even recognize the distinction between laws, decrees, and administrative
ordinances..."96 A Soviet l>:gal expert recently remarked that in the USSR there "has not
been a state of law even fcr one day."97 A respected Soviet journalist writing on legal
matters recently thus chan cterized an average Soviet official's attitude to law: "In their
consciousness there is neith it the slightest concept of law, nor understanding of it, nor fear
of it..."98 Simply listing the examples of most blatant, even naive, law breaking by Soviet
officials revealed under glarnost', would take up many volumes.
This is important be ;ause arms control agreements are legal acts, and officials who
are not used at least to keep ing the distinction between legal and illegal actions in the back
of their minds, are likely to treat arms control agreements not much better than their own
laws. It is only fair to say that when it comes to national security, few nations would feel
94V. Rubanov, "Demokratiya i bezopasnost' strany," p. 45.
9
->Natalya Gevorkyan, "Otkrove most' vozmozhna, lish' kogda za toboy zakroyetsya dver'," Moskovskie
novosti, June 24, 1990.
96Richard Pipes, Russia under th > Old Regime (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1974), p. 289.
97Arkadiy Vaksberg in "Kakim d )lzhno byt' pravovoe gosudarstvo?" Literaturnaya gazeta, June 8, 1988.
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completely bound by international law if their perceived interests are threatened. This
tendency, however, would be even more pronounced in the Soviet Union where, in
addition to the general contempt for law, national security has always been treated as an
extralegal matter.
A very important ci se of bureaucratic deception has been the nuclear disaster in
Chernobyl and its consequences. When the reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power station
exploded, the local officials tried to conceal the disaster and produced rosy assessments for
their superiors until the arrival of a high-level investigating commission from Moscow."
While this commission quickly established the true facts for the Soviet leadership, the latter
attempted to hide the reality from the Soviet and international public, a policy which
backfired embarrassingly because of modern space-based and other information gathering
systems: a graphic proof, if the Soviet leaders needed one, of how dated their secrecy
policy was.
Once the dimensions of the disaster were supposedly acknowledged, and the
Soviets received lavish international praise for their "unprecedented
openness," a marathon deception of the public began. For three years a
threatening radiation situation in Belorussia, the Ukrane and the Bryansk province of the
Russian Federation was concealed. It took the authorities three years to acknowledge that
one third of Belorussian territory had been affected by radiation from the Chernobyl
accident. The deception was perpetrated primarily by the agencies responsible for health
care and the environment!
Decisions were made to classify information on radiation levels in populated areas
when it was higher than acceptable, and on negative health consequences for personnel
involved in emergency work at Chernobyl. Military physicians were forbidden to mention
in case histories that their patients had worked on the Chernobyl cleanup unless they had
99G. Medvedev, "Nekompetentnosf," Kommunist, 1989, no. 4, pp. 98-103.
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suffered an acute case of radiation poisoning. Orders classifying radiation data secret were
issued as late as 1989!
It is noteworthy that the Soviet critics of government deception in the Chernobyl
case are deeply concerned about the Soviet bureaucrats' use of Western experts who
support official positions without understanding the Soviet reality. In one case, an expert
of the World Health Organization was allegedly told by Soviet officials that inhabitants of
Belorussian villages severely poisoned by radiation are not resettled because it is cheaper to
supply them with all the food they need from other areas of the country (local agricultural
products are dangerously radioactive). When told by local citizens that in reality there are
not enough supplies of "clei n" food and that they have to mix it with local radioactive food,
the Western expert simply r -fused to believe it! 10°
In a political culture where generations of bureaucrats have been raised without any
sense of accountability, pate ntly false information is given to the public at home and abroad
in a most brazen fashion. The Soviet military typically behaves in this fashion. The
statement of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defense Ministers, which disclosed the
strength of Warsaw Pact forces, made it clear that civilian employees were not counted
because they do not undergo military training. 101 Civilian employees of the Group of
Soviet Forces in Germany, vvhen signing their contracts, are not told that they would have
to take part in military trai ling. Upon arrival in East Germany, however, they discover
that, in their own words:
We all ha e without exception, in addition to our
full time jobs, to participate in military training-
even women who are exempt from military
service. We have to get up [at night] for combat
alerts, we have to wear military uniforms, we
have to take part in small arms, drills and other
types of military training. [Emphasis added]
100YeVgen jya Al'bats, "Bol'shaya lozh'," Moskovskie novosti, October 15, 1989.
101
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When a group of such civilians, whose letter was published in the government daily
Izvestiya, had tried to complain they had been told by a commanding officer that
"perestroika has not reached here and never will." 102 This is a disturbing example of
contempt among the Soviet military for legality, for international obligations of their
government, and for today's attempted change in Soviet security policies. This lie is also
useless, almost knee-jerk, because the civilians' military training contributes nothing to the
overall Soviet defense capability in Germany. At the same time, there is an encouraging
note: the letter was published in a Soviet newspaper, something unthinkable until very
recently. The military censorship apparently failed to stop it.
Just recently the Soviet military has demonstrated a disturbing propensity to
misinform its own government. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has insisted that in the
aftermath of the massacre of peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989, high-
ranking military officers consistently mislead him, a Politburo member, about the methods
they used for crowd control, and especially about their employment of toxic substances. 103
Shevardnadze has also accused the military of misleading the political leadership about the
fact that the Krasnoyarsk LPAR is indeed a violation of the ABM Treaty, an accusation
ringing true in light of the military's continuing refusal to recognize that the location of the
radar in contravention of the ABM Treaty's provision was a violation! 104
Many in the Soviet Union do not trust information supplied by the military on the
"real" Soviet defense budget, released in 1989. The Prime Minister Ryzhkov stated that
overall defense spending was 77.3 bin rubles. 105 Since that time the defense budget
102
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103Leonid Pleshakov, "Ubezhdaf pravdoy," Ogonyok, 1990, no. 11, reproduced in USSR Today. Soviet
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numbers have been questioned as too small by many in the Soviet public, including
Academician V. Avduevskiy, a top space scientist; 106 Major V. Lopatin, a radical Deputy
in the Supreme Soviet, who has quoted an unnamed Ministry of Defense official as saying
that in reality the defense budget is 120 bin rubles; 107 and Captain 3rd Rank A. Antoshkin,
a student at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, who has compared contradictory
statements of Soviet military officials on the subject, and concluded that the announced
defense budget numbers are meaningless. 108 It appears now that the doubters do have a
point. It follows from a statement by the Department Head in the Directorate of
Administrative Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers S. Guchmazov, that the
announced defense budget did not include:
...all direct and indirect expenditures which a
state makes in order to provide for a possibility of
its stable functioning in emergency situations,
including war. 109
Among such expenditures, Guchmazov lists pre-draft training, an
ineffective but omnipresent activity, partially financed through involuntary
membership dues; reserve officer training of students, which is carried out
in the majority of the Soviet colleges, each having a military department
staffed with officers up to general rank; and accumulation of state and
mobilizational reserves! 110 Following this logic, one is justified in
suspecting that such major items as construction, operation and
maintenance of very extensive nuclear war command, control and survival
106B. Konovalov, "Porazhenie militarizovannoy ekonomiki," Izvestiya., February 7, 1990.
107S. Aleksandrov, "Voennaya reforma," Nedelya, no. 22, 1990.
108A. Antoshkin, "Naemnaya armiya: dorozhe ili deshevle?" Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no. 9, 1990,
p. 39.
109A. Lopukhin, "Dividendy mini i konversiya," Pravda, July 30, 1990.
1 10/6z'rf. For details on the Sovu ( system of reserve officer training, see Mikhail Tsypkin, Soviet Reserve




facilities for the Soviet leadership, as well as some of the Civil Defense
facilities and activities, have not been included either! 111
The U.S. should be aware of the Soviet military's propensity to stage pokazukha,
or Potemkin villages (a historic Russian term!) as a knee-jerk response to anything
smacking of an inspection. It has become a routine practice to prepare military bases for
important visitors by painting grass (in lieu of real lawns), removing soldiers to different
quarters (so that they do not soil the cleaned up barracks), and turning the messes into
something akin to real restaurants. 112 This practice apparently took a quantum leap
forward in response to military glasnost' in 1988, when the Ministry of Defense began
mass construction of "show military settlements" (pokaznye voennye gorodki) specially
designed to impress visiting officials. Considerable effort and resources are devoted to
building expensively furnished (for instance, with wood panelled walls) barracks, gyms,
etc., while the real needs of the servicemen continue to be ignored. 1^ Such tendencies are
likely to complicate verificaiion of compliance with arms control agreements and confidence
building measures.
Not to be excessively pessimistic, we should note that most of examples of secrecy
and deception, including those in the military area, that this analysis relies upon, have been
drawn from the Soviet published sources! This is a hopeful sign, but it also
reminds us that we can be assured of Soviet military intentions and
capabilities only if the Soviet public is assured that it has an inalienable
right to know about their nation's military affairs.
i^For the extent of Soviet gigmtic effort to build and operate leadership survival facilities,see Soviet
Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat. 1988 (Washington, D.C.: US GPO, n.d.), pp. 59-62. The
Soviets have never seriuosly refuted this information.
112Danuta Yunavichene, "Sovetskaya armiya-teatr absurda," Kauno Aidas, September 21, 1989.
1
^Letter from political officer G. Grozmani, in Ogonyok, 1989, no. 50.
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3. 5. How Much Shou d the Soviet Public Know?
Defense Minister Yazov has recently proclaimed that transparency of military
activities will become "nearly the guarantee" of international security, because it allows the
"popular masses" interestec in the preservation of peace, to participate actively in military
affairs. 114 The experience s hows that so far the Soviet military is very uneasy about giving
its public the right to know.
Shocking as it may be for the Soviet military to see the U. S. Secretary of Defense
in the cockpit of a Blackjack; bomber, the most threatening (from the military's standpoint)
aspect of glasnost' has been the furious domestic public debate about the condition of the
Soviet Armed Forces. Mary vocal members of the public have begun to question widely
ranging military policies, from the poor condition of conscripts to the necessity for
conscription itself, to the si ze of the military budget, to the structure of the armed forces.
Glasnost' has opened up fc r discussion such topics as the military's responsibility for the
massacre of peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi, Georgia in April 1989, ethnic conflicts in
the military, and military pe formance in Afghanistan.
This has caused the extreme concern of the high command as well as lower ranking
officers. This concern ha< found a sympathetic ear in the Central Committee of the
communist party. The latter body, highly conscious of the pivotal role the military plays in
maintaining political stability inside the Soviet Union, issued an authoritative memorandum
demanding that the mass media limit its negative coverage of the military, and that the major
newspapers "borrow" from the Ministry of Defense its own journalists in officer uniforms
to write on military matters. This position was reaffirmed in another Central Committee
114Ya7ov. "Novaya model' bezopasnosti," p. 68.
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memorandum in November of 1989. 115 An analysis of the Soviet press, however, does
not show any visible impact of the memorandum, as criticism of the military continues.
The military has aho been quite concerned about an intrusion of academics and
other civilians into debates on Soviet military affairs. These academics have criticized
practically all aspects of the Soviet force posture, beginning with "tankomania" and ending
with blue water navy, and have clamored for release of classified information in order to
facilitate their analyses and public discussion (predictably, in a critical spirit) of military
policies. The military have responded by accusing academics and other civilian critics of
"incompetence" and irresponsibility. Typically, the military argues that its "scientific"
research proves that it is right, and its critics are wrong, but fails to disclose the nature of
this research (presumably, because it is classified), and labels the debates conducted by
non-military analysts as "hrrmful" for the "unprepared" public. 116 These counterattacks by
the military, however, so fai have done little to restrain their civilian critics.
There is an obvious relationship between the right of the Soviet public to know
about military affairs and the West's confidence in Soviet compliance with arms control
agreements and any other measures reducing the military threat. The Soviet military is
fearful of public intrusion into its previously closed domain, and is psychologically
unprepared for disclosing its policies to the public.
An attempt to build some degree of confidence between the military and the public
has been undertaken when the Group of Public Observers (GON) was established in the
spring of 1989. It is chaired by Dr. Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the USSR
Academy Institute of USA and Canada and Deputy Chairman of the officially sponsored
H^'Ob osveshchenii v tsentral'noi pechati zhizni i deiatel'nosti Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil," Krasnaya
zvezda, July 6, 1989; "O khode vypolneniya postanovleniya TsK KPSS ot 29 aprealya 1989 g. 'Ob
osveshchenii v tsentral'noi pechati zhizni i deiatel'nosti Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil'," Izvestiya TsK
KPSS, no. 1, 1990, pp. 14, 15.
116See, for instance, Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defence Is Sufficient?" International Affairs, April
1989, pp. 31-44; Major General Yu. Lyubimov, "O dostatochnosti oborony i nedostatke kompetentnosti,"
Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil 1989, no. 16, pp. 21-26; and Lt. General Ye. Volkov, "Ne razyasnyaet,
a zatumanivaet," Krasnaya zvezda, September 28, 1989. The quotes are taken from the last article.
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Committee of Soviet Scientists to Defend Peace. In the recent years, Dr. Kokoshin
emerged as one of the leading civilian analysts of military affairs and proponents of the
defensive doctrine. In his criticism of the Soviet military establishment, Dr. Kokoshin is a
moderate, compared to some of his more radical colleagues. The GON's goals are:
• To improve the relationship between the military and the
public.
• To confirm that unilateral force reductions, which do not
require verification, are actually carried out, and thus to
reaffirm "the practical application of the defensive doctrine."
• To inform the public about the problems encountered by
the servicemen discharged in the process of reductions, and
help find solutions to their problems.
• To maintain contacts with public opinion makers abroad,
and to invite, with permission of the General Staff obtained
by May 1989, "foreign public figures and parliamentarians
to take part in select observations of measures to reduce the
USSR Armed Forces." (At the time of this writing,
however, th ire have been no reports of GON joined by
foreign obsej-vers in any of their activities.)
This is not a program of an adversarial public watchdog in the Ralph Nader style!
Dr. Kokoshin recognized t lat in order to secure some cooperation of the military, GON
must emphasize the priority of "helping" the military with their painful socio-economic
problems. 117 If GON has to act as a military lobby on some issues in order to observe
troop cuts, how likely is tl at group to have the clout and will to uncover and publicize
violations of arms control t eaties by the military? It is not even clear if GON is indeed a
group, as follows from i' > name. So far the Soviet media have not identified its




'Elena Agapova , "Nash chek vek v kongresse," Krasnaya zvezda, September 15,1989; N. Sautin "Staryy
marsh dlya podlodki," Pravda, October 31, 1989; S. Sidorov, "Pod nablyudeniem obshchestvennosti,"
Krasnaya zvezda. May 16, 198* "V obstanovke glasnosti i otkrytosti,' Krasnaya zvezda. May 14, 1989.
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3. 5. 1. Secrecy and the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State
Security.
Hopes for a greater public participation in policy setting are primarily related to the
emergence of a two-stage Soviet parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies which elects
the Supreme Soviet to be in session for most of the year. The Supreme Soviet has
established a Committee on Defense and State Security-the KOGB. How likely is the
KOGB to rip the veil of secrecy and possibly expose deception in arms control?
The KOGB has 43 members. Of this number, twelve appear to be employed by the
Soviet defense industry, including the leaders of the Sukhoi and Ilyushin aircraft design
bureaus. Mikhail Simonov, the leader of the Sukhoi "firm," chairs the KOGB's
subcommittee on defense industry. The membership includes six military officers, three of
them high-ranking (former Chief of General Staff and now advisor to Gorbachev Marshal
Sergei Akhromeev, Army General Vitaliy Shabanov, the Chief of Armaments of the Soviet
Armed Forces, and Adm. Vitaliy Ivanov, Commander of the Baltic Fleet). One of the
middle-ranking officers on the Committee, Lt. Colonel Viktor Podziruk, appears to be a
maverick who defeated the commander of Soviet forces in Germany during the elections to
the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989. Another junior officer, Nikolai Tutov, turned
out to be a radical and joined the Interregional Group of Deputies, led by the late Dr. Andrei
Sakharov, Boris Yeltsin, Gavriil Popov and other proponents of drastic democratic reforms.
One member is an official of the DOSAAF-a "voluntary" society to assist the military.
Three are high-ranking KGB officers. Eight are party and government officials, including
two high-ranking party officials in charge of defense industry—Oleg Belyakov, the head of
the Central Committee Department of Defense Industry, and Arkadiy Vol'skiy, until recently
the head of the Central Committee Department of Machine Building Industry and also the
Kremlin's ruler of the dispu'ed Nagornyy Karabakh area of Azerbaijan. Two are scientists,
physicists ?nd Academy m mbers Yevgeniy Velikhov and A ndrei Gaponov-Grekhov, both
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rumored to have a long-standing involvement with defense work. This accounts for 32
members of the KOGB
.
The rest are educators, industry executives, and three reformist intellectuals: the
Belorussian writer Vasil' Bykov (intensely disliked by the orthodox ideologists and the
military since the 1960's for his realistic portrayal of World War II, of which he is a combat
veteran), and two social scientists from Estonia and Lithuania, one of whom, Mechis
Laurinkus, is a member of the Lithuanian mass movement for national revival, the Sajudis,
which is viewed with open hostility by the military. (The third Baltic deputy in KOGB,
Velio Vare, is a retired military officer now working in a historical research institute in
Estonia). 118
The personality of the man selected to be the first (until recently) KOGB Chairman,
Professor Vladimir Lapygin, is also of interest. Now sixty five, a son of a peasant who
apparently escaped into the city from the horrors of Stalin's collectivization, he has spent all
his life working in the Soviet aerospace industry. He is a specialist in missile guidance, and
has been the General Designer for the on-board control system of the Soviet space shuttle
Buran, a controversial project criticized recently because of the bureaucratic selfishness and
irrational management of the space program. Lapygin was elected not in Moscow, where he
lives and works, but in the distant Siberian Tuva Autonomous Republic with which he has
no obvious connection. That is a clear sign that he was designated by the communist party
apparatus as a Deputy to the Congress of People's Deputies to be elected in a "safe"
backwater district and eventually to the Supreme Soviet.
The positions Lapygin staked out made him sound like a party
loyalist: he believes that the mission of KOGB is to provide for "combat readiness" of the
118
"Komitety Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR i postoyannye komissii Soveta Soyuza i Soveta
Natsional'nostey," Fzvestiya, July 13, 1989; "Konversiya voennoy promyshlennosti v SSSR: kakoy put'
predpochtitel'nce?" Voennyy Vestnik APN, 1989, no. 21; Michael Dobbs, "Soviet army starts first labor
union over strong objections." the Washington Post Service in The Monterey Herald, October 22, 1989;
"Kommyunike zasedaniya Baltiyskogo Soveta," Atmoda, October 23, 1989; L. Sher, "Sil'na
differentsiatsiya, slaba integratsiya," Sovetskaya Estoniya , June 7, 1 989; A. Podvez'ko. "V sekretnom
komitete," Sovetskaya Estoniya, January 28, 1990.
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Soviet Armed Forces; he warns against "unilateral disarmament" and excessive zeal in
conversion of defense industry for civilian needs; he views with suspicion the nationalists in
the three Baltic republics, and he sees professional competence (in defense industry,
military, or state security) of deputies in KOGB as essential for the Committee's work—the
same emphasis on "competence" now used by the military trying to fend off their civilian
critics. Introducing KOGB membership to the press, Lapygin completely ignored its
"incompetent" members—a famous writer and two social scientists. Later he attacked one of
them, Vasil' Bykov, for his alleged lack of interest in the Committee's work. This attack
might have been in reality prompted by Bykov's negative views on the new armaments
programs. (See Section 3. 4. 3.) Lapygin had initially spoken up strongly in favor of an
all-volunteer military, a position opposite to that taken at the time by Defense Minister Yazov
and other top ranking officers (with the partial exception of C-in-C of the Soviet Navy
Admiral Chernavin). Later, however, Lapygin moved closer to Yazov's position
by advocating volunteer forces only for nuclear submarines, the Strategic Rocket Forces,
and strategic aviation.
As far as secrecy is concerned, Lapygin has strongly defended a need for
secrecy when it conies to new weapons and new technologies, and has said that
The USA knows of course that we are working on systems
capable in principle to countervail their SDL But this does
not mean that we must report in detail about our
achievements in this or that direction of research...
At the same time he criticized abuses of secrecy prompted by "primitive spymania," such as
making secret "the location of large defense enterprises and military bases known to the
whole world," or even by the desire to hide various violations. Actually the KOGB has
been meeting in secrecy, even without a classified stenographic record. An item which
would be made public in the West, such as General Yazov's report to the KOGB on global
military-political situatioi , was not disclosed. Only a meeting on defense industry
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conversion (a topic with obvious propaganda appeal) was public. The KOGB's criticisms
of the government's defense programs for FY '90 have been released through a newspaper
in a most general form. 119
Criticized for his cozy relationship with the military and for his attention to his
overwhelming professional activities at the expense of the KOGB work, Lapygin has
recently resigned from his post to be replaced by another trusted insider, Leonid Sharin, a
communist party official. 120
At this point one does not expect that the KOGB will be inclined to rip the veils of
secrecy over Soviet militar/ deployments and operations. It remains to be seen whether it
would protest as a whole, or whether its individual members would protest if they uncover
that the Soviet Armed Force s are cheating in arms control agreements. The pro-military bias
of the KOGB has been noted by Academician and People's Deputy Georgiy Arbatov, who
criticized it as "having a strange membership and working in a strange fashion," and doing
nothing to reduce military >ecrecy. 121 One of the few radical members of the KOGB has
revealed that the majority of the Committee's members believe that "the West still is
threatening us, that our country may become a victim of aggression at any time." According
to the same source, a minority is struggling against this view, but without visible
success. 122
It is not yet clear whether the military would inform KOGB about any violations or
potential violations of arms control agreements, or whether the members of KOGB would
be able to discover violations independently. So far, the Ministry of Defense has tried to
119
"Komitety Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR;" V. Kosarev, "S pozitisiy novog myshleniya," Krasnaya
zvezda, June 22, 1989; S. Taranov, "Glasnosf i gosudarstvennaya bezopasnost'," Izvestiya, June 26,
1989; Mikhail Tsypkin, "Turmoil in Soviet Science," Report on the USSR, July 21, 1989, p. 19; I.
Khristoforov, "Ukreplyat' trudnee chem sokrashchat'," Sovetskiy voin, October 1989, no. 19, p. 3;
Vladimir Lapygin, "Rassmatrivaetsya oboronnyy byudzhet," Krasnaya zvezda, October 5, 1989; V.
Kosarev, "Poiski optimal'nogo resheniya," Krasnaya zvezda, October 13, 1989.
120See, for instance, V. Lapshin, "Kto pravit bal v kosmose?" Argumenty i Fakty, 1990, no. 28,
reproduced in USSR Today. Siviet Media News and Features Digest, August 1, 1990, and Vladimir
Lopatin, "Armiya i politika," Znamya, July 1990, p. 157; Radio Liberty Daily Report, June 21, 1990.
121
"Vtoroy s'ezd narodnykh depitatov SSSR. Stenograficheskiy otchet." Izvestiya, December 19, 1989.
122Podvez'ko, "V sekretnom k( nitete."
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keep the Supreme Soviet de )uties in charge of military affairs in the dark on crucial matters.
For example, according to t le KOGB member Nikolai Tutov, the defense budget has been
disclosed to the KOGB me nbers in the same generalized form as to the public (operation
and maintenance, weapons acquisition, research and development, construction, pensions,
and miscellaneous), while any details concerning concrete programs have been witheld. To
counteract the Ministry's of Defense stonewalling, the more radical KOGB members are
coming to rely on individuals they euphemistically refer to as "consultants;" who in reality
are whistleblowers—disgruntled defense industry specialists, military and KGB officers
who provide, despite threat > of retribution, several KOGB members with information that
their agencies are trying to conceal. 123
4. 0. MILITARY GLAXNOST': FUTURE SCENARIOS.
The future balance between glasnost' and secrecy in the military will be affected by
such factors as the general political situation in the Soviet Union, the dominant ideology,
the role of military in politics and the Soviet view of the outside world. Today's extremely
volatile political situation i l the Soviet Union can confront us with a variety of scenarios
determined by these factors.
4. 1. The Uncertain Soviet Future.
Gorbachev is a brilli ant tactician capable of defending his power and pulling rabbits




hardly a far-sighted strategist of reform, as he is generally perceived in the West. A
conservative critic compared Gorbachev to a pilot of an aircraft who has taken off without
any idea of where he is g jing to land. Though unkind, this comparison has a point:
Gorbachev has not been pre pared for the enormous complexity of the task of reforming the
Soviet empire. He has aire ady been through two radically different economic programs,
neither of which worked. The nationalist explosions in the Soviet Union have obviously
caught Gorbachev by surpr se.
Perhaps it is not hunanly possible to be prepared for the tasks that Gorbachev is
facing: the problems are t( o numerous and diverse, they have festered for decades, and
there is little in Gorbachev' . and his allies' communist intellectual baggage preparing them
for truly new approaches o these problems. However commendable are Gorbachev's
efforts to give his country ; real legislature, the result is an emerging conflict between the
communist party and the S jpreme Soviet, a duality of power deemed dangerous even by
pro-reform Soviet experts en internal security. 124
While the tradition; 1 sources of authority are crumbling, and the new ones are not
really established, Soviet society has become a seething ocean of volatile relatively
unstructured political and ethnic popular movements, clashing with each other and the
government. Some of these conflicts have already brought substantial casualties. In the
language of political sciew e, this is a classical situation of high social mobilization with
low political institutionaliz ition, a recipe for instability and possibly violence. 125 Indeed,
one of the 1989's bestseller ; in Moscow was an anti-utopia portraying the Soviet Union in
1992 as plagued by violer ce of all against all in an empire which has collapsed when
Gorbachev's failing reforms were interrupted by a military coup. 126 In September 1989,
124See, for instance, Rubanov, ' Demokratiya i bezopasnost' strany," p. 49.
125See Samuel P. Huntington, F ilitical Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), pp. 8-47.
126Aleksandr Kabakov, "Nev( /.vrashchenets," Iskusstvo kino, June 1989, reprinted in Novoe russkoe
slovo, September 22-26, 1989.
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Gorbachev felt it necessary to deny that the country was sliding into chaos and civil
war. 127 But such possibilites are now discussed openly and seriously in mass media. 128
This is not to say that Gorbachev and the policies currently associated with him are
doomed. The fact that he has survived thus far is an indication by itself that there exist
some socio-political structures supporting his policies. But had Gorbachev been so
confident in the strength of these structures, he would not have tried to amass potentially
dictatorial powers in his hands first as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and then, when
this post turned out not be strong enough, as President of the USSR. It is only logical to
recognize that if the emergence of Gorbachev with his perestroika and glasnost' on the
Soviet political scene was unpredictable, then we have to consider seriously political
scenarios which even today seem shocking.
4. 2. Scenario One: Modernization Muddles Through.
Let us assume that Gorbachev survives in power with at least some of his current
political program intact. This means continuing efforts to integrate the Soviet Union into
the world community and modernize it internally. This scenario is favorable for preserving
and broadening military glasnost', but at a closer look we will discover some problems.
Continuation of Gorbachev 's policies will most likely mean years of political instability.
While Gorbachev's curre it policies of democratization are pointing towards some
"demilitarization" of Soviet state and society, "the future development of these processes,"
127
"Vystuplenie General'nogo ekretarya TsK KPSS, Predsedatelya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR M. S.
Gorbacheva po Tsentral'nomu te' %videniyu," Pravda, September 10, 1989.




as David Holloway has observed, "remains uncertain, and the danger exists that the
military might be a willing instrument in bringing them to an end." 129
Such an "end" could easily come if (some might say, when) Gorbachev has to use
the military to impose martial law in vast areas of the Soviet Union to suppress nationalist
movements or/and workers' strikes. Actually, the military (usually the paratroopers) have
already supplemented the internal security troops' "law and order" operations in
Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Moldavia. 130 The military is beginning to recognize
openly its role as the ultima e guarantors of stability of the Soviet empire. A staff writer for
the Ministry of Defense daily newspaper described the military as "a powerful
counterbalance to those" vho are using perestroika to oppose the fundamentals of the
Soviet system. Lt. Genera) O. Zinchenko, Commander of the Political Directorate of the
Baltic Military district, described the Soviet military as "the main obstacle to a restoration of
bourgeois [political] structures..." 131 Minister of Defense General Dmitriy Yazov,
speaking at a Plenary meeting of the Central Committee in September 1989, bluntly
demanded that the party leadership put an end to manifestations of nationalism in the Union
Republics and warned: "we have no right to underestimate the concerns
(obespokoennost") of those who bear arms." 132
The first full-scale use of force for maintaining regime stability occured in
Azerbaijan in January 1990 In that case, Gorbachev was criticized for not using the troops
during anti-Armenian violence there, and giving the military their marching orders only
when the communist party control was gravely threatened. Accusations of preoccupation
with communist party powt r over the issue of saving lives might very well be true; but it is
also possible that Gorbachev hesitated to use the armed forces in the Azerbaijani-Armenian
129David Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev," International Security, Winter
1989-90, vol. 14, no. 3, p.24.
130See V. Zyubin, "O demokrat i i poryadke," Krasnaya zvezda, August 8, 1990.
13 1 S. Ishchenko, "Armiya zash :hishchaet nas, a kto zashchitit armiyu?" Molodaya gvardiya, November
1989, p. 222; Lt. Gen. O . Zinc! enko, "Sluzhim v Pribnltike," Krasnaya zvezda. December 20. 1989.
132D. Yazov, "Armiya druzhby bratstva narodm "
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conflict until too late because, among other things, he was reluctant to give the military a
greater political role.
Greater reliance on the military for maintaining regime stability will have a negative
impact on military glasnost'. First, the more of the Soviet territory is under martial law (or
its equivalent), the more reluctant will be not only the military but also the politicians to lift
the veil of secrecy from military operations out of fear of embarrassment or out of concern
for operations security. The initial reaction of the Kremlin to the proclamation of
Lithuanian independence was very much along these lines: the use of the military to
intimidate the nationalists and the closure of the Lithuanian territory to foreigners.
Second, the military (or, at least, the senior officers) see glasnost' as something
imposed upon them, associated with the loss of war in Afghanistan, decline in the
military's prestige and budget, unceremonious discharge of tens of thousands of officers
into an uncertain future, vigorous public criticism of the military, doubts about the need for
military force in a new international environment, etc. Although quite a few junior officers
have become politically radicalized and do not share anti-glasnost' sentiments, it is clear
that the senior officer corps would use the first opportunity, presented by an improvement
of the military's political fortunes in the course of a military crackdown, to curtail
glasnost'.
The greater the military's political clout, the less responsive it might become to the
needs of politicians to impress the West with military glasnost'. There have been some
signs of the military's increased assertiveness in this area. A day before Gorbachev-Bush
summit in Malta the Soviet military detained a group of U. S. servicemen assigned to the
American military mission in Potsdam apparently while they were observing Soviet military
activities. Given the political sensitivity of such an act, and given that the Soviets had been
trying hard to come to the summit without a baggage of aggravation, we might assume that
the Soviet military acted with more than usual political boldness and independence!
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In another example, only days before Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
acknowledged that the large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk was a violation of the
Treaty, the Ministry of Defense daily had printed an article signed by a First Deputy Chief
of the General Staff flatly denying this. 133 This was quite a confrontational gesture, given
that the political leadership had already implicitly recognized the violation (when
Shevardnadze had pledged to Secretary of State James Baker that the radar would be
destroyed), and that the military command must have known or at least anticipated that a
public confession of a violation might follow.
4. 3. Scenario Two: A Conservative Take-Over.
This scenario does not involve a return to power in the Kremlin of orthodox "fire-
and-brimstone" Marxist-Leninists who would restore Stalinist purity to the Soviet Union.
The longer glasnost' continues with its revelations about past abuses and failures, the more
do both the Soviet elite and people see other communist regimes (especially the ultra-
orthodox ones, like in Rumania, GDR or Czechoslovakia) being blown away by popular
discontent, the more isolated are the regimes where communist parties still have the
monopoly on power, the more elections do communist officials lose in the Soviet Union,
the less likely will be an attempt to restore Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy
there, because it is too discredited to provide a basis for regime legitimacy.
What will be the new ideological foundation for legitimacy of a government ruling
what today constitutes the Soviet Union? It might be that the idea of democracy by itself
will gradually become such a foundation, and then a scenario described in the Section 4. 1.
will evolve towards a stable constitutional democracy over years, if not decades, of
133Col. General B. Omelichev, ' Snyat' ozabochennost," Krasnya zvezdt . October 5. 1989.
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instability, martial law interspersed by thaws, etc. The gravest threats to such a course of
political development are presented by the multi-ethnic imperial character of the Soviet
state, the dismal economic situation, and the lack of a democratic tradition. These three
factors can conspire to create a new conservative ideology out of the remnants of Soviet
communism and elements o Great Russian nationalism.
The Soviet regime h is tried, since the days of Stalin, to strengthen its legitimacy by
appealing to Great Russian nationalism, and has done so with some success. Despite the
fact that for the most part Russian nationalists have no sympathy for Marxist-Leninist
ideas, they still identify themselves with the empire built by the followers of that ideology.
As a result, the weakening of the Kremlin's grip over the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe
and along the ethnic periphery of the USSR itself, is often perceived by Great Russians as
an affront to their national p ide or even as a threat to their national existence.
The formation of such an ideology is already taking place, and the Soviet military is
taking an active part in th s process. This ideology is broadly characterized by acute
concern over the fate of the Russian nation within the Soviet Union, hostility towards the
nationalist movements in L nion Republics, an extreme anxiety about the stability of the
Soviet state, an emphasis or Russia's unique place among nations, on its glorious past and
national pride, strong feelings against Western influences and perceived victimization of
Russia by the West, and, last but not least, strong support for the military as a major
ingredient of Russian patriotism.
Among the major groups and social elements subscribing to and developing this
type of ideology, are: anti-reformist communist party members, both professional party
functionaries and industrial executives, etc., who have attracted some industrial workers
into so-called Workers' Fronts; members of Russia's creative intelligentsia; and military
officers. The military have opened the pages of their press to some of the more notable
figures in this ideological movement, from Nina Andreeva (whose "letter", promoted by
anti-Gorbachev elements n the communist party in 1988, was promptly reprinted by
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newspapers of military districts), to Aleksandr Prokhanov, a pro-military author and now
one of the leaders of a Russian nationalist organization the United Council of Russia
(Ob'edinennyy sovet Rossii), to Karem Rash, a previously unknown school teacher who
glorifies the past, present and future of the Soviet Armed Forces. 134
Some military officers and veterans have been making public statements along the
lines of this nascent ideology, most notably Col. General Boris Gromov, the last
commandeer of the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan and now commander of the crucially
important Kiev Military District. 135 An unprecedentedly vicious attack on perestroika and
"new thinking" in foreign policy was delivered by Gen. Al'bert Makashov, the commander
of the Volga-Urals Military District, at the First Congress of the Russian Communist Party
in June of 1990. To the applause of this predominantly conservative gathering, Makashov
described as "learned turkeys" the "new thinkers" who deny existence of an immediate
threat of attack on the Soviet Union, and made thinly veiled threats of a military coup. 136
According to the former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, who has joined the democratic
opposition, Makashov "gave away the position of many high-ranking military and KGB
officers." 137
It is difficult to assess the popularity of such views among the officer corps. An
analysis of the voting patterns of military officer-members of the Russian Federation
Congress of People's Deputies shows that only 16 percent of the votes of top military
officers were cast for proposals sponsored by the democratic bloc, "compared with 82
percent against, whereas among the middle-level army officers the figure was 63 percent
134Karem Rash, "Armiya i kul'tura," Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, no. 2, 1989, pp. 3-15; no. 3, 1989,
pp. 3-10; no. 4, 1989, pp. 3-13; no. 5, 1989, pp. 3-11; no. 7, 1989, pp. 3-13; no. 8, 1989, pp. 3-13; no.
9, 1989, pp. 3-14; S. Pashaev, "Aleksandr Prokhanov: 'Nasha assotsiatsiya prizyvaet k soglasiyu',"
Krasnaya zvezda, October 24, 1989; Col. Yu. Vashkevich, "Chest'," Krasnaya zvezda, November 10, 1989.
On Karem Rash, also see Holloway, "State, Society, and the Military under Gorbachev, pp. 22, 23, and
Mikhail Tsypkin, "Karem Rash: An Ideologue of Military Power, Report on the USSR, vol. 2, no. 31, pp.
8-11.
135Nikolai Bulavintsev, "Pravda vyshe sensatsii," Sovetskaiya Rossiya , November 15, 1989.
136Col. Gen. A. Makashov, "My ne sobirayemsya sdavat'sya." Krasnaya zvezda June 21, 1990.
137L. Zagal'skiy, O. Moroz, "Tsenoy general'skikh lampasov," Molodezh' Gru-ii July, 27, 1990.
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(37 percent against), and among junior officers--73 percent (22 percent against). 138 At the
same time, according to People's Deputy Major V. Lopatin, the failure of new
representative bodies to take care of the rapidly deteriorating social conditions of the officer
corps is making junior officers increasingly subject to manipulation by their conservative
superiors. 139
The RSFSR 1990 elections platform of "the Block of Social-Patriotic Movements
of Russia" (which includes a group of USSR People's Deputies-members of the deputies
"club" "Russia", as well as a number of new cultural and political organizations) describes
"reasonable defensive suf iciency" as "naive." A group of nationalistically minded
People's Deputies from the Russian Federation criticized during its "working meeting" in
December 1989 the alleged "euphoria" from "growing foreign policy contacts" which
should not "conceal the ob/ious fact that the ring of American bases around our country
has not been weakened, that disarmament is so far conducted unilaterally [by the USSR],
that the COCOM technological blockade of the Soviet Union has been joined by South
Korea." 140
Russian nationalists have expressed concern that glasnost' would allow foreigners
unimpeded access to something that can only be described as Russia's non-military non-
secrets. They have recently targeted their attacks on article 37 in the draft law on state
archives, permitting foreigners to make copies of Soviet archival documents and take them
out of the USSR. 141 The fear of free market methods is combined with general anger
against foreigners, who enjoy, from the point of view of an average Russian, a lifestyle in
the Soviet Union beyond the wildest dreams of a Soviet citizen. As the economy
deteriorates, as the ruble increasingly loses any buying power, and as hard currency
138Julia Wishnevsky, "The Two Sides of the Barricades in Russian Politics Today," Report on the USSR,
August 24, 1990, p. 17.
139Sergei Leskov, "Krasnaya ar niya vsekh sil'ney," Nachalo, July '90, no. 3.
140"Za politiku narodnogo sogli siya i rossiyskogo vozrozhdeniya," Literaturnaya Rossiya, December 29,
1989; "Eto vystradano samoy zh zn'yu," Literaturnaya Rossiya December 14, 1989.
141 B. Pirogovskiy, "Otechest ennye arkhivy: natsional'noe dostovanie ili boykaya rasprodazha?"
Literaturnaya Rossiya, Decemb r22, 1989.
Tsypkin
68
becomes the symbol of prosperity in these trying times, anti-foreign sentiment may become
a serious political factor exploited by a Russian nationalist conservative political force. This
would create frictions and difficulties in verification of earlier concluded arms control
agreements, as Americans, s teeped in their highly legalistic political culture, insist on strict
verification and compliance , and as the Soviets, increasingly secretive and non-legalistic,
react with irritation and evasion.
The emergence of a political leadership inspired by an ideology of the sort described
above would have a dampening impact on military glasnost'. One element in such a
leadership, which would represent a coalition of various groups, the communist
conservatives, has already spoken up against military glasnost'. At the April 1989 Plenum
of the Central Committee, when many of Gorbachev's reformist policies came under sharp
criticism of party functionaries, the proposed relaxation of the system of state secrets came
under fire from R. S. Bobovikov, candidate member of the Central Committee and party
leader of the Vladimir oblasi':
One cannot agree with those who propose to open wide all
state borders, to declassify all military secrets. Even in the
era of glasnost' there must be and there will be industrial
enterprises and design bureaus closed from excessively
curious eyes. 142
Similar views have been expressed by the Nina Andreeva, whose earlier mentioned letter
made her a symbol of traditionalist resistance to reforms:
...glasnost' is not an end in itself.. .That is why its limits are
historically movable and flexible. It is known that glasnost'
has been limited everywhere in times of military conflicts
and crises. It does not involve military and state secrets,
scientific and technological secrets. 143
l42Materialy plenuma Tsentral nogo Komiteta KPSS. 25 aprefya 1989 goda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989),
pp. 24, 25.
143Nina Andreeva "Glasnost' ( lyazyvaet," Molodaya Gvardiya , no. 7, 1989, p. 274.
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This position would exclude a relaxation of secrecy now (because the USSR is clearly in
crisis) and in general, because if military, state and scientific and technological secrets are
not subject to glasnost', what is? Hostility against Western access to Soviet military
"secrets" has been voiced recently by a very vocal member of the Congress of People's
Deputies from Estonia E. Kogan. (He operates within the loose alliance of party
conservatives, Russian nationalists and workers' fronts). He accused an unnamed People's
Deputy of participating in overflights of "foreign agents" over Soviet "military facilities"
(obviously a reference to one of the recent gestures of military glasnost'). 144
Conservative Russian nationalism puts emphasis on Russian "uniqueness," which in
effect contradicts the current trend (however inconsistent) to integrate the Soviet Union with
the rest of the world. 145 The less the Soviet Union is integrated into the world community,
the more reasons for political tensions in the future, and consequently the more reasons for
military secrecy.
Another ever-present strand of Russian nationalism is a fervent belief that Russia
and the Russians have traditionally been victimized by foreigners, have been too
accommodating to foreigners for Russia's good, that Russia has been destroyed by
Marxism imported from the West, and is being destroyed now by mindless importation of
Western ideas and culture. For example, many prominent Russian nationalists have
protested sales of raw materials to the West as an act of devastation of Russia's natural
riches as a result of a plot between cynical Western capitalists and Soviet cosmopolitan
bureaucrats. The above-mentioned election program of the Russian nationalist group
144Statement by People's Deputy E. Kogan in "Vtoroy s'ezd narodnykh deputatov SSSR.
Stenograficheskiy otchet," Izvesiiya, December 24, 1989.
145This view spreads from the extremists of the Pamyat' xenophobic organization to the enlightened
Russian nationalists like Dr. Igc r' Shafarevich. See, for instance, I. Shafarevich, "Dve dorogi - k odnomu
obryvu," Novyy Mir, July 1989
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describes Western investors as "economic occupants," and pledges to annul "anti-people"
business deals "without any compensation" to foreign businesses. 146
Similar concerns are apparently present among the military. Defense Minister Yazov
expressed irritation about "kowtowing" to foreigners because of glasnost'. When asked
about foreign access to the formerly closed city of Vladivostok, Yazov was reported to have
said: "None of them [foreign delegations] will break their backs by making a call and
notifying in advance that they wish to pay a visit." 147 A colonel teaching at the Frunze
Military Academy recently said that enemies of the Russian people are exaggerating the
potential economic benefits of defense cuts, because the real sources of economic problems
are international agreements (the context suggests that he had trade agreements in mind, but
one cannot exclude that he also implied arms control agreements) which frequently have the
effect of enslaving Russi i to foreigners. In the same breath the colonel expressed
considerable irritation abou the calls for further military glasnost'. 14*
The emphasis on tie state as the guarantor of stability and distrust of society,
implicit in the conservative ideology, as well as the special role this ideology grants to the
military as an institution of nearly mystical importance for the development of the national
character, are not conducive to military glasnost'. A regime guided by this ideology will
also be more likely to use force to quell ethnic and labor unrest than a modernizing regime
such as described in Seen irio One. Such a regime would react negatively to military
glasnost'. (See Section 4.2 )
It is clear from the above that a change to a conservative Russian nationalist regime
will reverse military glasnost' and make the USSR or its successor regime/s a difficult arms
control partner for the U.S. and NATO.
' 46
"Za politiku narodnogo soglasiya i rossiyskogo vozrozhdeniya."
ia7Moscow Radio Domestic Service in Russian, 0900 GMT, July 3, 1989, in FBIS-SOV, July 3. 198".
,/l8
Col. A. Yefimov, "Zachem ii i eto nado," Nash sovremennik, November 1°89.
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So far the conservai ive Russian nationalists have attracted relatively little overall
popularity. They did very poorly in the 1990 elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's
Deputies, and lost in their common effort with anti-reform communists to prevent Boris
Yeltsin's election as the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Their main liability in the
eyes of the public has been their support for the most conservative elements in the
communist party and their de facto alliance with the highly unpopular party apparatus. 149
The same goes for the milit;iry high command, who seem to find it incomprehensible that in
today's political climate their insistence on loyalty to the communist party only discredits
them. But the pace of change in the Soviet Union is so rapid, that we cannot preclude a
situation when the conservative alliance would no longer be hampered by the association
with the old regime. The democratic mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov, has warned the
enormous economic problems are already giving the communists voted out of power a
second chance, as they begin to use their new power of opposition, now no longer blamed
for all the social ills, to mobilize the population. 150
4. 4. Scenario Three: Democratic Reform.
What if radical and rapid democratic reform is pursued in the Soviet Union? So far,
the supporters of democratic change seem to be on the ascendance in most of the union
republics. In Russia, they have also made an important political move of identifying
themselves with the Russian national interests when Boris Yeltsin proclaimed the
sovereignty of the Russian Federation.
The representatives of the democratic ideological strand in the Soviet political
spectrum are clearly in favor of continuing integration of the Soviet Union into the world
149See Lyudmila Saraskina, "Primirenie na lobnom meste," Znamya, no. 7, 1990, p. 195.
150Gavriil Popov, "Dangers of Democracy," The New York Review of Books, August 16, 1990.
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community, committed to openness in government, and regard the Soviet military as a
burden on the nation's economy and political structure rather than a pillar of the state.
Lately the democratic reformers have clashed repeatedly and heatedly with the military over
budget, secrecy, conscription, etc. If in power, they will be inclined to move the borders of
military glasnost' far enough to reassure the West against Soviet deception.
There are two major questions concerning this scenario. The first one is: will
democratic reformers be able to enforce their military policies? Given the absence of a
democratic political tradition and the precarious economic conditions in the Soviet Union, a
government of democratic reformers, if it wants to survive, could afford to antagonize the
military only so far. In this difficult and hazardous transition, micromanaging military
glasnost' (which is necessary given the military's lukewarm feelings about it) might be
impossible. If the military are already challenging the civilian authority of Gorbachev, their
resistance to an intrusion by a government of liberal democrats unsure of its own power
(and loathed by top Soviet military officers ), is likely to be much stronger. And no change
in the system of government will cancel the negative characteristics of the Soviet/Russian
bureaucratic political culture, at least in the short term.
The second question is: how relevant will be arms control agreements and the
military glasnost' policies pursued by a democratic government in Moscow? Whatever else,
such a government is likely to preside over the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a national
security entity. Much of the arms control baggage from today and immediate future will
simply be of no importance if the Soviet Union is replaced by several successor states. This
is especially true of any agreements reducing conventional forces and their activities. Many
of the union republics are already demanding military formations of their own. If they
become completely independent or independent within a loose federation, they are likely to
acquire their own conventional forces, and not be bound by agreements concluded
previously by the all-Union government in the Kremlin.
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While even the liberal democrats in Moscow, who advocate the right of
independence for the union republics, agree that the best way for handling the Soviet arsenal
of nuclear weapons will be to leave them under the control of some type of a federal military
command in Moscow 151 (some union republics, like the Ukraine, have already declared
their intention to stay non-nuclear), the reality might turn out to be different. If the Soviet
strategic arsenal ends up split between several successor states, they might very well refuse
to carry out all or some of the provisions of arms control agreements signed earlier by
Moscow without their consent. Such agreements and their verification provisions might
have to be renegotiated with the Soviet successor states. Political stability in the region now
constituting the Soviet Union is of paramount importance here: the more hostile the relations
between successor states, the lower the likelihood of their observing and successfully
renegotiating the existing arms control and confidence building agreements.
Still, the fact that a government of radical reformers would be seeking a long-term
accommodation with the West on the basis of common political values would by itself
reduce the justification for military secrecy. A government of this type in Moscow will also
be more likely to manage a reasonably amicable dissolution of the Soviet monolith than
either the muddling-through Gorbachevian modernizers or the outright conservatives.
4. 5. Scenario Four: Disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Disintegration of the Soviet Union is a plausible scenario today when the
unthinkable is becoming a reality throughout the communist world. It can result from any
of the three scenarios described above. The muddling modernization (Scenario One) may
fail and end immediately in an explosion of chaos. The Gorbachevian muddling
151 Viktor Altaev, "Vooruzhenr /e Sily SSSR: v kontse puti," Vek XX i mir, no. 6, 1990, p. 30.
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modernizers might be replaced by the Russian nationalist conservatives (Scenario Two).
These are likely to cause increasing hostility in the Union Republics because they lack the
ability or the desire to understand the problems of national minorities in the Soviet Union, or
are outright hostile to them and ready to use force to save the Soviet/Russian empire. This
might lead to an outbreak of anti-Russian resistance in the Union Republics, growing into a
civil war. The liberal democrats (Scenario Three) might be unable to thwart a coup by the
conservatives in alliance with the military and the KGB, resulting again in a possibility of
the chaos and devastation of Scenario Four.
Under Scenario Four, the military will be involved for a length of time in internal
operations, which is not conducive to glasnost'. This would be particularly true of
conventional forces, which would be directly involved in attempts to restore order, fight
secessionist movements, etc. If by that time, however, the Soviet conventional forces leave
Eastern and Central Europe and there is no political base for their reintraduction, the degree
of secrecy or glasnost' around Soviet conventional forces would be less of an immediate
concern to NATO and the U.S. Of immense concern during such a time would be glasnost'
about the Soviet strategic forces. We can only hope that even under conditions of
disintegration of the central authority the Soviet military would manage to
comply with at least the most important provisions of nuclear arms control
agreements and maintain a degree of openness about their nuclear forces and
operations necessary for reassuring the United States about the Soviet
compliance, capabilities and intentions in the realm of strategic weapons.
5. 0. CONCLUSIONS.
The Soviets have made some substantive and symbolic steps to military glasnost'
real, which are beneficial to Western security interests. Unfortunately, such benefits are so
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far limited, and might remain so in the future. These limitations stem from the transitional
character of military glasnost': born, together with other Gorbachev's innovations out of a
profound crisis of the Soviet politico-economic system, it leads an uneasy existence
assailed by the Russian/Soviet tradition of secrecy, bureaucratic self-interests of the
military, and increasing uncertainty of the future of reforms. The policy of military
glasnost' does serve the Soviet political and economic needs of today because it helps
reduce East-West tensions, makes public criticism of the many shortcomings of the military
establishment possible, and, being a part of the general overhaul of the system of state
secrets, should contribute to development of a modern society in the USSR. It has by no
means become entrenched in the Soviet political and military institutions and traditions, and
can be reduced or overturned by a changing course of political events, just as it was bom
out of such a change. Moreover, the established tendency to give exclusive control over
designating secrets and declassifying information to the bureaucratic agency which "owns"
a given type of secrets (in our case, it is the Ministry of Defense and various defense
industrial ministries) is likely to slow military glasnost' down.
One finds the abundance of contradictions to be the most salient feature of military
glasnost' and associated policies. Military glasnost' is apparently not a part of strategic
deception campaign to lull the West into a false sense of security. At the same time,
military glasnost' is obviously catering to Western public opinion. Military glasnost' has
resulted in declassification of some genuinely secret information, but it has not abolished
military secrecy: instead, it is supposed to make the Soviet system of military secrets more
modem. Military glasnost' is intended to reveal information that the West is likely to obtain
through satellite and other technical intelligence means, while retaining secrecy around
military and militarily significant research and development.
Military glasnost' is organically linked with the new "defensive military doctrine,"
but those in charge of implementing the new doctrine and glasnost'—the Soviet military—are
themselves all too freque ltly either confused or negative about Gorbachev's military
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doctrine. It is possible that in the future Western expectations of defense-oriented change
in Soviet military posture, based on today's promises, would collide with sabotage and/or
inertia of the Soviet military establishment in executing these changes.
It is even more important that the political context of military glasnost' is extremely
volatile. Glasnost' in general and military glasnost' in particular run counter to the deeply
embedded traits in the Soviet/Russian political culture, and are encountering resistance from
an alliance of communist party traditionalists and conservative Russian nationalists.
Military glasnost' is part of a campaign to narrow the gap dividing the Soviet Union from
Western democracies, a goal which is increasingly attracting the ire of this alliance.
Moreover, the growing instability of the Soviet empire is likely to create conditions
unfavorable to military glasnost'. If Gorbachev's reformism continues to muddle through,
the regime might rely increasingly on the military to maintain stability throughout the
empire, which would give the military additional political clout and increase the need for
operations security-both factors unfavorable to military glasnost'. If conservative forces
come to power, their hostility to the West and to glasnost', and their close relationship with
many high-ranking military officers, as well as greater reliance on the military for
maintaining stability, will have a strongly negative impact on military glasnost'. Radical
reformers, if they come to power, will be sympathetic to military glasnost', but might lack
the clout to enforce openness in the military establishment. Moreover, the weakness of the
Soviet regime or its successors and of their military establishment might prompt them to
become more secretive in order to avoid exposing that weakness.
Each of these three scenarios may lead to disintegration of the Soviet empire and/or
temporary collapse of central authority. This would mean massive involvement of the
military in politics and security operations, neither condition conducive to military
glasnost'. Under this scenario, military glasnost' itself would lose some of its relevance
because the meaning of at least some arms control agreements concluded now or in the near
future would be lost in ;i changed world. At the same time, the West will have a
Tsypkin
77
tremendous stake in assuring the security and stability of Soviet command and control of
nuclear weapons, and we may only hope that a measure of military glasnost' sufficient for
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